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________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract. Google’s Android is a comprehensive software framework for mobile communication devices (i.e., 
smartphones, PDAs). The Android framework includes an operating system, middleware and a set of key 
applications. The incorporation of integrated access services to the Internet on such mobile devices, however, 
increases their exposure to damages inflicted by various types of malware. This paper provides a comprehensive 
security assessment of the Android framework and the security mechanisms incorporated into it. A 
methodological qualitative risk analysis that we conducted identifies the high-risk threats to the framework and 
any potential danger to information or to the system resulting from vulnerabilities that have been uncovered and 
exploited. Our review of current academic and commercial solutions in the area of smartphone security yields a 
list of applied and recommended defense mechanisms for hardening mobile devices in general and the Android 
in particular. Lastly, we present five major (high-risk) threats to the Android framework and propose security 
solutions to mitigate them. We conclude by proposing a set of security mechanisms that should be explored and 
introduced into Android-powered devices. 
Keywords: Mobile devices, Malware, Intrusion Detection System, Google, Android, Risk analysis, Security 
solutions for mobile devices. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Designed as open, programmable, networked devices, smartphones are vulnerable to 
attacks. An infected smartphone can inflict severe damage to both users and the cellular 
service provider. Malware on a smartphone can: make the phone partially or fully 
unusable; cause unwanted billing; steal private information (possibly by phishing and 
social engineering methods); or infect every name in a user’s phonebook [Piercy, 2005]. 
Attack vectors of malware propagating into smartphones include: Cellular networks, 
Bluetooth connection, Internet (via Wi-Fi, GPRS/EDGE or 3G network access), 
USB/ActiveSync/Docking and other Peripherals [Cheng, 2007]. 
The first smartphone virus, Cabir, was released in 2004 by the 29A virus writing 
group as a proof of concept of a self-replicating virus. Since then, several hundreds of 
smartphone viruses have emerged, many of which contain malicious codes and cause 
various levels of damage to smartphones. Smartphone malware evolve very quickly due 
to the experience virus writers have gained from the computer and Internet world. 
According to Gostev (2006), two years of smartphone virus evolution are equivalent to 
twenty years of work in computer viruses. Among the most prominent smartphone 
malware types are: the worm families -- Lasco/Cabir [Emm, 2005] and 
Commwarrior/Mabir [Schultz, 2006]; the Trojan viruses -- FlexiSpy, RedBrowser and 
Skulls; the Windows CE and CardTrap viruses [Leavitt, 2005]; and recently the iPhone 
ikee worm
1
 and iPhone/Privacy.A hacking tool
2
 that exploited vulnerabilities in jail-
broken iPhone systems. 
So far major pandemic outbreaks have been limited in scale due to the lack of a 
critical mass of victims. Nevertheless, since the smartphone market share is expected to 
increase significantly over the next few years, almost fivefold by 2013 [Frost and 
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Sullivan, 2007], smartphones will provide a fertile ground for viruses. Another major 
factor attracting hackers is that smartphones are often carried for business purposes and 
are likely to have sensitive information. They also provide remote access to a company’s 
most sensitive data, which can lead to data leakage if their phones are hacked into. 
Among the most significant smartphone operating systems that have arisen recently is 
Google’s Android framework. As a smartphone, the challenge for assuring Android’s 
security is becoming similar to the personal computer [Muthukumaran, 2008]. Mobile OS 
makers are now very much concerned with the security challenges that PCs have been 
facing down through the years. The increasing number of attacks on mobile platforms 
(especially on smartphones) along with the increasing usage has led many security 
vendors and researchers to propose a variety of security solutions for mobile platforms. 
As a case in point, Symbian and Google have designed their operating systems to enable 
applications to run only in specialized sandboxes, minimizing the capability of malware 
to spread [Lawton, 2008]. A robust application signing and certification mechanism was 
integrated into Symbian’s operating system and was proven highly effective in reducing 
malware attacks. This paper reviews and assesses the security mechanisms incorporated 
in Google’s new Android framework. We provide a list of security mechanisms which 
can be incorporated to harden the Android. Based on this description we are able to make 
some recommendations on the efficacy and priorities of various security mechanisms. 
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Fig. 1. Paper’s structure 
 
Figure 1 depicts the paper’s structure. We start with description of related academic 
literature focusing on protection of mobile devices (section 2), description of the Android 
framework (section 3) and analysis of security mechanisms incorporated into it (section 
4). In section 5 we describe the results of our security analysis and in section 7 we 
provide a list of security of applicable defense mechanisms for hardening mobile devices 
in general and the Android in particular. Section 6 describes the outcomes of a qualitative 
risk analysis that we conducted and presents five major (high-risk) threats to the Android 
framework. We conclude by proposing a set of security mechanisms that should be 
explored and introduced into Android-powered devices (section 8). Conclusions and 
future work are discussed in section 9. 
 
 2. RELATED WORK 
Our overview of related academic literature indicates that most extant research on 
protection of mobile communication devices has focused on host-based intrusion 
detection systems. These systems, using anomaly detection or rule-based methods, 
extract and analyze (locally or by a remote server) a set of features indicating the state of 
the device. Several systems are reviewed in this section and summarized in Table I. 
 
Table I: Academic research on protection of mobile devices. 
Paper Approach Detection method Detects 
Moreau, 1997 HIDS 
Anomaly 
detection using 
ANN 
Fraudulent use of the operator services such as high rate 
calls. 
Samfat, 1997 
(IDAMN) 
HIDS, NIDS 
Anomaly 
detection; 
Rule-based 
detection 
A user is being active in two different locations at the 
same time; traffic anomaly detection; and detecting 
anomalous behavior of individual mobile-phone users 
based on the telephone activity (such as call duration) 
and user’s location in the network. 
Yap, 2005 HIDS 
Signature-based 
detection 
Proof of concept- detects unauthorized attempt to create 
SMS message. 
Cheng, 2007 
(SmartSiren) 
HIDS, NIDS 
Anomaly 
detection 
Detects anomaly behavior of the device and outbreak of 
worm-related malware. 
Schmidt et al., 
2009 
HIDS 
Anomaly 
detection 
Monitor a smartphone running Symbian operating 
system and 
Windows Mobile in order to extract features for 
anomaly detection. These features are sent to a remote 
server for further analysis. 
Bose, 2008 HIDS 
Signature-based 
detection. 
Using Temporal Logic to detect malicious activity over 
time that matches a set of signatures represented as a 
sequence of events. 
Kim, 2008 HIDS 
Signature-based 
detection 
Detects, and analyzes previously unknown energy-
depletion threats based on a collection of power 
signatures. 
Buennemeyer, 
2008 (B-SIPS) 
HIDS, NIDS 
Anomaly 
detection 
Detects abnormal current changes and its correlation 
with network attack. 
Nash, 2005 HIDS 
Statistical method 
(linear regression) 
Detects processes that are likely to be battery-draining 
attacks. 
Jacoby and 
Davis, 2006 
(B-BID) 
HIDS 
Signature-based 
detection 
Monitoring power consumption against “normal” power 
consumption range. Once an anomaly is detected, 
various system data is matched against known attack 
signatures. 
Miettinen et al. 
(2006) 
HIDS, 
NIDS 
Event correlation 
Combines both host-based and network-based data 
collection in order to be able to utilize the strengths of 
both detection approaches.  
Hwang et al., 
2009 
 
Authentication 
 
Keystrokes 
dynamics 
Collected 5 features to train and build a classifier 
capable of detecting impostor users. Utilized artificial 
rhythms and tempo cues to overcome problems 
resulting from short PIN length. 
 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) were used [Moreau, 1997] in order to detect 
anomalous behavior indicating a fraudulent use of the operator services (e.g. registration 
with a false identity and using the phone to high tariff destinations) based on 16 features 
representing mean and standard deviation of the total duration and number of long/short 
term national and international calls. 
The Intrusion Detection Architecture for Mobile Networks (IDAMN) system [Samfat, 
1997] uses both rule-based and anomaly detection methods. IDAMN offers three levels 
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of detection: location-based detection (a user active in two different locations at the same 
time); traffic anomaly detection (an area having normally low network activity 
experiencing high network activity); and detecting anomalous behavior of individual 
mobile-phone users. In order to detect anomalous behavior, a profile is generated by 
monitoring the user’s telephone activity (e.g., call duration, inactivity time between two 
calls, number of handovers performed, total number of calls in a session and total 
duration of calls in a session). In addition, the user’s location in the network (roaming) is 
monitored by generating a state machine with the probability of moving from one 
location (cell) to another. 
Yap et al. (2005) employ a behavior checker solution that can detect malicious 
activities in the system. They present a proof-of-concept scenario using a Nokia Mobile 
phone running a Symbian OS. In the demonstration, a behavioral detector detects a 
simulated Trojan attempting to use the message server component without authorization 
to create an SMS message. 
Cheng et al. (2007) present SmartSiren, a collaborative proxy-based virus detection 
system. Single-device and system-wide abnormal behaviors are detected by the joint 
analysis of communication activity of monitored smartphones. The SmartSiren 
architecture consists of a back-end proxy that interacts with lightweight agents on the 
protected devices. The agents merely collect information and relay it to the proxy that 
performs the analysis and sends out the alerts. 
Schmidt et al. (2008) monitored a smartphone running a Symbian OS by extracting 
features that describe the state of the device and which can be used for anomaly 
detection. These features were collected by a Symbian monitoring client and forwarded 
to a Remote Anomaly Detection System (RADS). The gathered data was analyzed in 
order to distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior. The results indicated that 
most of the top ten applications preferred by mobile phone users affected the monitored 
features in different ways. 
An interesting behavioral detection framework is proposed in [Bose, 2008] to detect 
mobile worms, viruses and Trojan horses. The method employs a temporal logic 
approach to detect malicious activity over time. A malware behavior is represented by 
describing the temporal ordering of an application’s actions which may reveal malicious 
intent even when each action alone may appear harmless. A database of malicious 
behavior signatures was generated by studying more than 25 distinct families of Symbian 
OS malware. Next, a two-stage mapping technique constructs these signatures in run-
time from the monitored system events and API calls in the Symbian OS. The system 
differentiates the malicious behavior of malware from the behavior of benign applications 
by training a classifier based on Support Vector Machines (SVM). 
Special effort has been devoted to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that analyze 
generic battery power consumption patterns to block Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks or to detect malicious activity via power depletion [Racic, 2006]. Martin 
et al. (2004) propose three main methods for an attacker to drain the battery: (1) Service 
request attacks, where repeated requests for services are made to the victim, typically 
over a network. The target must expend energy handling the request even if the service is 
not provided; (2) benign power attacks, where a victim is induced to repeatedly execute a 
valid but energy-consuming task; and (3) highly intrusive attacks, where the attacker 
modifies an executable to make it consume more energy than actually required. 
Kim (2008) presents a power-aware, malware-detection framework that monitors, 
detects, and analyzes previously unknown energy-depletion threats. The framework 
collects power consumption samples and generates power signatures. These signatures 
 are used for classifying mobile malware by measuring the similarity between power 
signatures using the χ2-distance measure. 
The Battery-Sensing Intrusion Protection System (B-SIPS) [Buennemeyer et al., 
2008] for mobile computers alerts when abnormal current changes are detected. The B-
SIPS correlates host-based anomaly detection with the Snort IDS which provides 
signature-based detection of attack. 
Nash et al. (2005) presented a design for an intrusion detection system that estimated 
power consumption according to a linear regression model, based on parameters such as 
CPU load and disk accesses, to determine the amount of energy used on a per process 
basis and to identify processes that could potentially exhaust batteries. 
Jacoby and Davis (2006) presented a host Battery-Based Intrusion Detection System 
(B-BID). The basic idea is that monitoring the device’s electrical current and evaluation 
the correlation with known signatures and patterns can facilitate attack detection. 
Miettinen et al. (2006) claimed that host-based approaches are required, since 
network-based monitoring alone is not sufficient to encounter the future threats. They 
adopt a hybrid network/host-based approach. A correlation engine on the back-end server 
filters the received alarms according to correlation rules in its knowledge base and 
forwards the correlation results to a security monitoring GUI to be analyzed by security 
administrators. 
Hwang et al. (2009) evaluated the effectiveness of Keystroke Dynamics-based 
Authentication (KDA) on mobile devices. Their empirical evaluation focused on short 
PIN numbers (four digits) and the proposed method yielded a 4% misclassification rate. 
 
3. THE ANDROID FRAMEWORK 
Android
3
 is an application execution environment for mobile devices that includes an 
operating system, application framework and core applications. The applications are 
written in Java based on the APIs provided by the Android Software Development Kit 
(SDK). The foundation of the Android software stack is the Linux Kernel. Android uses 
Linux for its device drivers, memory management, process management, and networking. 
Usually, an application developer will not be directly programming to this layer. The next 
level up contains the Android Native Libraries. These libraries are written in C/C++ and 
are used by various system components in the upper layers. Incorporating these libraries 
in Android applications is achieved through Java interfaces. This layer contains a 
customized C-library, an SQL database engine, 2D and 3D graphic libraries, a native web 
browser engine (WebKit) and media codecs (e.g., MPEG-4 and MP3). Next is the 
Android Runtime, consisting of the Dalvik Virtual Machine and the core libraries. Dalvik 
runs .dex (Dalvik Executable) files which are more compact and memory-efficient than 
Java class files. This is an important consideration for battery-powered devices with 
limited memory. The core libraries are written in Java and provide a substantial subset of 
the Java 5 SE packages (e.g., standard collections, I/O, networking, utilities) as well as 
some Android-specific libraries which are needed for accessing the capabilities that the 
hardware, operating system and native libraries offer. The Application Framework layer, 
written fully in Java, includes Google-supplied tools as well as proprietary extensions or 
services. An important component of the framework is the Activity Manager, which 
manages the lifecycle of applications. The top layer is the Applications layer for 
implementing such applications as a phone, web-browser, email client and more. Each 
application in Android is packaged in an .apk (Android package) archive for installation. 
The .apk is similar to a standard Java jar file in that it holds all code and non-code 
resources (e.g., images, manifest) for the application. The Android package is a collection 
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of components. Components in one apk are isolated from components in another apk and 
can only communicate with each other and share data through means provided by the 
system. Each apk is associated with a primary process in which all of the application's 
components (i.e., Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers and Content Providers) are 
executed. These application's components, along with capabilities, permissions and 
requirements should be listed in the AndroidManifest.xml file. Detailed description of the 
application's components and related security properties is provided in [Enck, 2009b]. 
 
4. ANDROID’S SECURITY MECHANISMS  
Android is a multi-process system, where each application (and parts of the system) runs 
in its own process. For the most part, security between applications and the system is 
enforced at the process level through standard Linux facilities, such as user and group 
IDs assigned to applications. In addition, access-control is provided through a permission 
mechanism that enforces restrictions on the specific operations that a particular 
application can perform. Several security aspects and mechanisms are bundled by Google 
in the Android framework. Enck (2009b) and Burns (2008) present the main components 
of an Android application and how the Android-specific mechanism can be used correctly 
to protect an Android application. We cluster them into three general groups: Linux 
mechanisms, environment features and Android-specific mechanisms (Table II). 
 
4.1 POSIX (Portable Operating System Interface) Users 
Each Android package (.apk) file installed on an Android-powered device is given its 
own unique Linux (POSIX) user ID. This user ID is assigned when the application is 
installed on the device. Consequently, the code of two different packages cannot run in 
the same process. In a way, this creates a sandbox that prevents one application from 
touching other applications (or, vice versa, other applications from touching it). In order 
for two applications to share the same permissions set and possibly run in the same 
process, they must share the same user ID, which is only possible through the use of the 
sharedUserID feature. To share the same user ID, two applications must explicitly declare 
the usage of the same sharedUserID and both must bear the same digital signature (see 
section 4.8). 
Seeing as an application’s code always runs in its own process, regardless of how it was 
invoked (by that application directly or by a form of communication from another 
application), the permissions the code is run with are that of the owning application (both 
regarding file access and application-level permissions). For example in a scenario where 
the Contacts application open's the SMS application's editor, the editor would both be 
able to send an SMS and access any files owned by the SMS application whereas the 
contacts application that triggered the starting of the editor could do neither. 
 
4.2 File Access 
Files in Android (both application- and system-files) are subjected to the Linux 
permission mechanism. Each file is associated with the owner-user and group IDs and 
three tuples of Read Write and eXecute (rwx) permissions. The first tuple is enforced on 
the owner; the second on users that belong to the group; and the third is for the rest of the 
users. Those permissions bits are enforced by the kernel. Generally, system files in 
Android are owned by either the “system” or “root” user, and application files are owned 
by an application-specific user. The access permissions for files are derived from the 
 Linux’s user mechanism and reflect the level of access permitted to other users (i.e., other 
applications). In the same manner, due the difference in user IDs, system files are 
protected from ordinary applications. Files created by an application will be assigned that 
application’s user ID, and will not be accessible to other applications (unless they share 
the same user ID through the sharedUserID feature or files are set as globally 
readable/writeable). Linux provides many system functionalities as semi-files. This 
mechanism effectively allows setting permissions on files, directories, drivers, terminals, 
hardware sensors, power state changes, audio, direct input readings, shared memory, and 
access to background daemons. 
One aspect that reinforces these various security measures is that the system image is 
mounted as read-only. All important executables and configuration files are located on 
either the ramdisk (which is read-only too, but also reinitialized from a known state on 
every boot) or the system image. Therefore, an attacker that gains the ability to write to 
files everywhere on the file system is still denied the possibility of replacing critical files. 
However, an attacker can increase the attack’s complexity and overcome this limitation 
by remounting the system image. This, however, requires root access. 
Two other interesting partitions on the Android file system are the data partition and 
the SD card. The data partition is where all user data and applications are stored. Since 
this partition is distinguished from the system partition, it effectively sets a quota on the 
amount of user data that can be input or loaded into the device. This effective quota 
prevents the system partition from damage in case the user (or a malicious attacker) 
installs too many applications or creates too many files. When the Android device is 
started in “safe mode”, files from the data partition are not loaded, making it possible to 
recover from such attacks. The SD card is an external storage device, and therefore can 
be manipulated off-line, and out of the control of the device. The only file system that is 
supported on the T-Mobile G1 phone for such a card is the FAT file system. The FAT file 
system does not support UNIX-like permissions and file ownership, both of which can 
only be set through mount options. 
 
4.3 Memory Management Unit (MMU) 
A prerequisite of many modern operating systems and Linux in particular, is the Memory 
Management Unit (MMU), a hardware component which facilitates separation of 
processes to different address spaces (virtual memory). Various operating systems 
employ the MMU in such a way that one process is unable to read the memory pages of 
another process (information disclosure), or to corrupt its memory. The likelihood of 
privilege escalation is reduced since a process is unable make its own code run in a 
privileged mode by means of overwriting the private OS memory. 
 
4.4 Type Safety 
Type safety is a property of programming languages. It forces variable contents to adhere 
to a specific format and therefore prevents erroneous or undesirable usage. Partial or 
missing type safety and/or boundary checks can lead to memory corruption and buffer 
overflow attacks, which are the means to arbitrary code execution. As noted, Android 
employs Java, which is a strongly typed programming language. Programs written in this 
environment are less susceptible to arbitrary code execution. This is in contrast to such 
languages as C, which allows casting without type checking, and performs no boundary 
checks unless they are specifically written by the programmer. Android allows programs 
to have native components written in C, at the risk of potentially reduced security. 
Binder, the Android-specific Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanism, is also type 
safe. Types of data elements that are passed by Binder are defined by the developer on 
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compile time in Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL). This ensures that types 
are preserved across process boundaries. 
 
4.5 Mobile Carrier Security Features 
A basic set of attributes of telephony systems, and utilities in general, come from the 
need to identify the user, monitor usage and charge the client accordingly. A more 
general term is AAA, which stands for Authentication, Authorization and Accounting. As 
a smartphone, Android borrows these classical security features from cellular phone 
design. Authentication is usually done by a SIM card and associated protocols. The SIM 
card contains a secret shared only by the card and the operator. 
 
Table II. Security mechanisms incorporated in the Android. 
Mechanism Description Security issue 
Linux mechanisms 
POSIX users 
Each application is associated with a different 
UID. 
Prevents one application from 
disturbing another. 
File access 
Application’s directory is only available to the 
owned application. 
Prevents one application from 
accessing files of another. 
Environment features  
Memory 
Management Unit  
Each process is running in its own address space. 
Privilege escalation, information 
disclosure, DoS. 
Type safety 
Enforcing variable content to adhere to a specific 
format, both in compiling-time and runtime. 
Prevents buffer-overflows, and stack 
smashing. 
Mobile Carrier 
Security Features 
Using SIM card to authenticate and authorize 
user identity. 
Phone call theft. 
Android-specific mechanisms 
Application 
permissions 
Each application declares which permission it 
requires at install time. 
Limiting application abilities to prevent 
malicious behavior. 
Component 
Encapsulation 
Each component in an application (e.g., Activity, 
or Service) has a visibility level that regulates 
access to it from other applications (e.g., binding 
to a service) 
Prevents one application from 
disturbing another, accessing private 
components or APIs 
Signing 
applications 
Application apk files are signed by the developer 
and verified by the package manager. 
Matching and verifying that two 
applications are from the same source. 
Dalvik VM Each application runs in its own virtual machine. 
Prevents buffer-overflows, remote code 
execution, and stack smashing. 
 
4.6 Application Permissions 
The heart of the application level security in Android is the permission system which 
enforces restrictions on specific operations that an application can perform. The Package 
Manager is in charge of granting permissions to applications at installation and the 
application framework is in charge of enforcing system permissions on runtime. 
There are about a 100 built-in permissions in Android which control operations 
including: dialing the phone (CALL_PHONE), taking pictures (CAMERA), using the 
Internet (INTERNET), listening to key strokes (READ_INPUT_STATE) or writing an 
SMS (WRITE_SMS). Any Android application can declare additional permissions. In 
order to obtain permission, an application must explicitly request it in its manifest (the 
application’s “contract” with Android). Permissions have associated protection levels: (1) 
Normal (permissions that are not especially dangerous to possess); (2) Dangerous 
(permissions that are more dangerous than normal, or not normally needed by 
 applications; such permissions may be granted to an application with the user’s explicit 
confirmation); (3) Signature (permissions that can only be granted to other packages that 
are signed with the same signature as the one declaring the permission); and (4) 
SignatureOrSystem (a signature permission that is also granted to packages installed in 
the Android system image). 
The assignment of protection level is left to the developer’s will, intuition or common 
sense. However, the following guidelines are useful in the process. “Normal” permissions 
should imply minor risk and serve only as a “heads-up” for the user that the application is 
requesting access to such functionality. “Dangerous” permissions on the other hand, 
should be used for operations implying a more substantial risk. A careful balance needs 
to be maintained between the two categories to avoid misclassifying dangerous 
operations as low-risk which may result in the unwise granting of access to the 
functionality. The other extreme (stating everything is “dangerous”) is just as risky, and 
may cause the user to ignore the importance of the protection level due to lack of 
contrast. Contrary to the “Normal” and “Dangerous” levels, “Signature” permissions are 
intended only for operations intended to be used by applications from the same developer 
(“Same-origin” policy). Lastly the “SignatureOrSystem” level is discouraged as a whole. 
At installation, permissions requested by the application are granted to it based on 
checks against the signatures of the applications declaring these permissions and 
interaction with the user. After the application has been installed and its permissions have 
been granted (perhaps partially) it can no longer request any further permissions and no 
permissions, once denied, can be granted since there is no further interaction with the 
user after the installation. An operation which has not been granted permission will fail at 
run-time. Thus, when installing an application, the user has but two choices - trust the 
developer or not. If he decides to trust the developer (i.e., trust the application) all 
permissions will be granted. Otherwise, the only option is not installing the application. 
In such a case the factor with the most influence on the user’s choice is his craving for the 
application requesting the permissions. 
In addition to guarding protected framework APIs, the permission mechanism can and 
should be used to secure the various components in an application which are the Activity, 
Service, Content Provider and Broadcast Receivers. This effect is achieved primarily by 
associating permissions with the relevant component in its declaration in the manifest and 
having Android automatically enforce for the existence of the permissions in the relevant 
scenarios. An Activity, which is the UI building block of an Android application (any 
screen a user sees on the device and interacts with), can specify a set of permissions that 
will be required for any applications wishing to start it. In a similar manner a Service, 
which is the background building block of Android applications, can control which 
applications will be allowed to start/stop it or to bind to it. Whereas such permissions 
provide a crude restrictions, a more fine-grained control of any API exposed through 
binding can be obtained through run-time checks of the permissions granted to the bound 
application.. Content Provider provides the means to store and share data. It may define 
permissions to regulate who is allowed to read or write the information associated with 
the Content Provider. Since the read and write permissions are defined separately and are 
not interconnected, the Content Provider has fine-grained control over access. Intent 
Broadcasts (what an application wants to be done) and Broadcast Receivers (executed by 
the system in reaction to Broadcasted Intents) can both be associated with a set of 
permissions. For the Broadcast Receiver this feature makes it possible to control which 
components are allowed to broadcast the Intents it is configured to receive. For the 
component that is broadcasting the Intent, this associative feature provides the ability to 
control which Broadcast Receivers will receive it. The implication is that any attempt to 
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spy on the Intents being broadcasted is severely crippled and efforts to spoof broadcasts 
by unauthorized components will fail. 
 
4.7 Component Encapsulation 
By providing an application with the ability to encapsulate its components (i.e., Activity, 
Service, Content Provider and Broadcast Receiver) within the application content, 
Android disallows any access to them from other applications (assuming that they bear a 
different user-ID). This is primarily done by defining the “exported” feature of the 
component. If the “exported” feature is set to false, the component at hand can only be 
accessed by the owning application and any other application sharing its user-ID through 
the shared user-ID feature. If set to true, it can be invoked by external applications. 
However, the invoking applications may still be controlled through the permission 
mechanism as described in the above section. It is prudent to always set the “exported” 
feature manually and not to count on the default behavior of the system since it may not 
coincide with the expected behavior. Naturally, whether a component is encapsulated or 
not, has no effect on its ability to access other components, which is limited only by their 
encapsulation and access permissions. 
 
4.8 Signing Applications 
Each application in Android is packaged in an .apk archive for installation. The .apk 
archive is similar to a Java standard jar file in that it holds all the code (.dex files) for the 
application. In addition it also contains all the application’s non-code resources such as 
images. The Android system requires that all installed applications must be digitally 
signed (code and non-code resources). 
The signed apk is valid as long as its certificate is valid and the enclosed public key 
successfully verifies the signature. Signing applications in Android is used to verify that 
two or more applications are from the same owner (“same-origin” verification). This 
feature is used by the sharedUserId mechanism and by the permission mechanism to 
verify Signature and SignatureOrSystem protection level permissions. 
 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section we describe findings from our comprehensive assessment of various 
security aspects of the Android framework which were validated on a T-Mobile G1 
device. Among the elements we analyzed are: the codes of various Android components; 
the application permission-granting mechanisms and application installation process; and 
the applicability of existing Linux and Java malware. 
 
5.1 Analysis of the Android Framework’s Cornerstone Layers 
This subsection describes the outcome of our analysis of Android’s lower layers. We 
adopted a security-oriented, code-review approach to identify potential vulnerabilities. It 
should be noted that Android includes a substantial number of lines of code and we did 
not attempt to review and look for all vulnerabilities/bugs in the code. Rather we focused 
on special locations that might be problematic such as interfaces, structures etc. The code 
that we reviewed is based on the USA variant of the T-Mobile G1 device, version RC30. 
 
 5.1.1 Linux Kernel 
The Linux kernel is not famous for its security. In fact, in 2007, 83 CVE (Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures) entries were logged on it, a little over one entry a week. In 
2008, 73 CVE entries were logged. The drivers and vendor-specific additions serve as 
two locations that are particularly “hospitable” to bugs. Drivers and subsystems run with 
the highest privileges. A vulnerability that is detected and exploited by the hacker will 
usually achieve his/her goal, i.e. “root access”. From the results of our analysis, we 
conclude that proper security countermeasures should be added to this layer. The 
following paragraphs list several decisions taken while implementing Android on the G1 
device and discuss their security implications. 
 
Submitting code to mainline: Code that is integrated into the mainline passes several 
phases of checks and validations. When code is reviewed, bugs are more than likely to 
surface; some may have security implications. In this regard, Android has diverged from 
the mainline kernel by adding (or extensively modifying) vendor-specific drivers and 
modules that were not reviewed. Some are not likely to be merged without serious 
redesign. Additionally, modifications implemented by Google on top of the Linux kernel 
were published in a deployed platform before attempting to submit the changes upstream. 
Examples of such modifications include the Android shared memory driver (Ashmem) 
that allows applications to share and manage memory at the kernel level and an Inter-
Process Communication mechanism (Binder). 
 
Development phase: Developers are required to verify that development-stage 
backdoors and logging components are removed before deployment in the production 
environment. But in two cases, this best-practice was never properly verified. In the first 
example, all versions up to and including RC29 had a debugging-phase code which sent 
to a background root shell every key that was pressed on the keyboard. This back-door on 
the G1 device enabled users to gain full control of the system (i.e., root user). A second 
example is the kernel logging facility (dmesg) that developers used but which may lead to 
a Denial of Service (DoS) by too-verbose drivers that do not rate-limit their logging 
messages. The Binder is a notable example of an overly-verbose driver. This issue was 
handled recent Android firmware and many logging messages were removed. 
 
Modification and extension of existing functionality: Some of Google’s modifications 
extend existing functionality. In some cases a better choice would have been to integrate 
these modifications into other components. Examples of such components are the 
Ashmem which extends Shmem and the Lowmemorykiller which extends the Out-Of-
Memory (OOM) killer. Shmem is a standard POSIX feature which allows multiple 
processes to share memory. Ashmem, however, is an Android wrapper over Shmem 
which uses the ability of the kernel to release shared-memory allocations when the 
system is tight on memory. The standard OOM-killer, under tight memory conditions, 
first asks kernel subsystems to voluntarily free memory. If no memory is freed, the 
OOM-killer resorts to killing a process. The decision as to which process to kill is based 
on multiple attributes such as consumed memory, CPU time, permissions etc. Android’s 
lowmemorykiller is more aggressive since it kills a process without regard to whether 
memory has been freed voluntarily or not. 
 
Hardcoded POSIX users and groups: Android modifications include hardcode user ids 
(uids) and group ids (gids) in the kernel code. These modifications contradict the basic 
design decisions in Linux. However, Android is not a general Linux platform and using 
hardcoded group IDs to manage security configuration without extensive additional 
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security infrastructure is a legitimate solution. In fact, it increases security since the 
system services are not required to run with root privileges. Two examples of such 
modifications are the “paranoid network” set of changes that limits network access based 
on gids, and the Binder which accepts the first process that uses it as its master, but only 
if it has the “system” group. 
 
Kernel Configuration: The Linux kernel is highly configurable. On the G1 device, many 
common Linux options are disabled in order to reduce memory consumption. Less code 
means a reduction in vulnerability. On the other hand, it also means omitting “security 
enabler” modules. A few examples that have security implications are: disabling the 
auditing support and BSD task accounting (less input is available to the host-based 
intrusion detection system); disabling SYN cookie support (if enabled, it can reduce the 
chance of SYN flood attack); enabling PPTP, L2TP and IPSec-based VPN connections 
(on Android release 1.6; i,e., Donut); enabling the CFS scheduler group scheduling (no 
application is able to monopolize the CPU); disabling security modules (such as 
SELinux) and enabling NetFilter (allowing the implementation of a host firewall). 
Enabling these modules in the kernel configuration requires a trivial amount of effort 
(and also consumes minor memory space); although, providing the means for using these 
modules is not trivial. This requires additional user-space components that will provide 
the API for such modules in order to avoid the need for root access. As an example, the 
SELinux module requires code and script modifications [Shabtai, 2009c]. 
 
5.1.2 System Libraries 
Android makes use of many native libraries. These libraries are intended to be used by 
native processes, other native libraries or by Dalvik through Java Native Interface (JNI). 
JNI is a method for calling native methods from Java in the context of the same process. 
JNI is normally used for: (1) providing low-level functionalities (e.g., string operations, 
socket access, file handling, thread creation, Inter-Process Communication); (2) 
implementing computationally intensive calculations (e.g., handling multimedia and 3D 
graphics); (3) hiding code and licensing issues; and (4) leveraging existing libraries. 
The native libraries are written in C/C++, which is not type safe. Thus, native libraries 
have a higher chance of bugs than Java code. Since JNI loads native libraries in the 
memory space of a Dalvik process, bugs in the native library may crash the Dalvik 
process, corrupt its memory or cause arbitrary code execution. For that reason, system 
libraries are a target when searching for security vulnerabilities. 
At both the development stage and following the release of the first device, Android’s 
native libraries had already been exploited. The main sources of these exploited libraries 
were outdated vulnerable versions of ported libraries, such as the SQLite (a lightweight 
relational database engine), Webkit (Web browser engine) and the new implementation 
of native libraries. Writing libraries from scratch means that bugs were not flushed out. 
Perhaps even more reprehensible from a security perspective is that Google published 
Android’s native libraries code just as the first device hit the market. 
 
5.1.3 Dalvik Runtime 
Dalvik is a Java Virtual Machine (VM) based on Apache Harmony which was 
extensively modified and adapted for environments with low memory. Dalvik is a 
complex component with approximately 73k lines of C/C++ code, 8k of assembly and 
390k lines of Java (not including auxiliary utilities or unit tests). Since much of it is new 
 (including the .dex file format the VM runs), it needs to be screened for security 
problems. Dalvik provides the possibility of executing native code through JNI without 
requesting permission for it. Employing native code, however, should be used wisely 
since it removes the layer of defense provided by the VM. 
Securing Dalvik is crucial since vulnerability in the VM affects all applications. A 
potential weak spot is Dalvik VM .dex file loading code which is required to deal with 
.dex files from unreliable sources. 
By inspection of the Dalvik code we conclude that sanity checking is implemented in 
the initial loading code. Additionally, many “assert” statements are visible, which log a 
message when a sanity check fails. However, “assert” statements are useful for 
development and QA, but not for stopping maliciously malformed files. Furthermore, we 
also found pointer arithmetic that was not sanity checked (e.g., the pointers to the strings 
table, types table, class tables). As a result, we were able create a malformed .dex file that 
during installation caused the Package Installer to crash resulting in a phantom 
application that cannot be uninstalled because the installer claimed it is already installed, 
nor can another package with the same package name be installed if it has a different 
signature. 
The verification process of .dex files that is performed during the installation of the 
application is also applied whenever the .dex files are loaded to memory. Another 
lightweight verification is performed at run-time. Dalvik’s bytecode verifier does not 
enforce Java’s type safety. As a result an attacker may be able to compile his own type-
unsafe code to .dex bytecode and to run such bytecode. This may cause to the application 
to crash, or run “arbitrary” code. This is not a concern, seeing as: 1) the attacker will 
crash his own application/malware; and 2) both effects can be achieved by simpler means 
not involving the engineering of a malformed .dex file. Thus, malformed .dex files would 
not give the attacker any new capabilities in this case. 
A major design decision in regard to Dalvik was that it would only start once, and 
then get cloned. This initial “Zygote” process gets commands from the system server and 
acts accordingly. We found that an explicit check of the origin of commands, and 
commands from unreliable sources will raise an Exception. 
 
5.2 Application-Level Permissions 
Since Android is an open framework, device-holders are in the position of enjoying the 
wide variety of applications and services that developers are providing and will provide 
in the future. The downside is that it will be hard to inspect and block certain applications 
that will be provided by unreliable sources. It is very likely that a typical Android user 
will download unsafe software and simply click through various warning messages. 
The application-level permission mechanism is responsible for securing various APIs 
provided by the system and other applications. Whereas many of the core permissions are 
reserved for Google applications (due to their Signature or SignatureOrSystem protection 
level), a large variety of Normal and Dangerous protection level permissions are still 
available for non-Google applications. As a result abuse of such permissions is inevitable. 
An Internet access with the ability to read various contents stored on the device (e.g., 
SMS messages, call logs, contacts; GPS tracking; audio recording; and camera features) 
can be used to acquire confidential information or to spy on the user without his/her 
knowledge. Other malware-induced possibilities include: Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks, such as denying the ability to place non-emergency number phone calls; draining 
the battery; termination of applications; and the abuse of chargeable services (e.g., phone 
calls, SMS/MMS messages, and chargeable network traffic). 
Another source of difficulties arises from the shared user-ID feature. When an 
application declaring a shared user-ID is installed, all of the granted permissions are 
14 
 
 
 
ascribed to the shared user-ID. At runtime, each of the applications sharing that user-ID 
will be granted by a combined set of permissions. A simple attack scenario based on 
exploiting the user-ID feature would probably take place as follows. The user installs two 
applications sharing a user-ID. The first requests access to the Internet while the second 
wishes to access the contact list. As soon as both applications are installed, each 
application is capable of both reading the contacts and sending them through the Internet. 
The user, however, is unaware of the collaboration between the completely unrelated 
applications. 
A generalization of the above scenario may be seen as two seemingly unrelated 
applications that collaborate to leak information from the device using a shared medium 
to transfer the information between the two. In the shared user ID scenario there was no 
need for a shared medium seeing as both applications were “as one”, however such a 
medium may be a Content Provider, an Intent, a Service with an exposed API or even a 
plain socket. 
 
5.3 Installing Applications 
Android applications are distributed as .apk (Android Package) files and the actual 
installation process can be perceived as the deployment of the .apk on the device. The 
.apk can be regarded as an archive containing the applications code (a .dex file) and non-
code resources. 
The Package Manager (the service responsible for the installation process) validates the 
correctness of the apk. Validation includes but is not limited to: verification of the digital 
signature; confirmation of legitimacy of shared user-ID or permission requests; and the 
validation/verification of the included .dex file. Due to the lack of a certificate authority 
(CA), it is not possible to verify the identity of the developer and consequently the 
integrity of the .apk. As a result, unless the application uses signed-related features 
(permissions or shared user-ID) any tampering with the .apk will not be detected. The 
package installation API is guarded by the INSTALL_PACKAGES permission which is 
of Signature protection level and defined in the core Android package. Thus, only 
Google-signed applications may serve as application-level wrappers for the Package 
Manager; i.e. malicious applications cannot install applications on their own. The 
“Package Installer”, a legitimate application-level wrapper for the Package Manager is 
included as one of the core applications that are supplied with the Android-operated 
device. 
There are three main methods for installing apk files on an Android device. They 
differ in how they obtain the .apk files and whether they interact with the Package 
Installer application or the Package Manager directly. The Android Debug Bridge (a 
command-line tool that is supplied along with the SDK) is intended only for developers. 
The installation command is issued from a PC which is connected to an Android device 
using a USB cable. The actual installation is done directly by the Package Manager 
without any user interaction and resulting in automatic granting of Normal and 
Dangerous permissions. The lack of user interaction makes the process a highly risky 
way of installing applications and has a high impact on the device’s security. Therefore, 
this method should not be used on applications with which the developer is not familiar. 
The two remaining installation options are intended for the general public, the primary 
and officially sanctioned one is installing via Android Market (a Google-proprietary 
application which allows browsing and downloading of applications that were published 
by different developers). Since the Market application is signed by Google, it interacts 
 directly with the Package Manager. The last installation method is based on installing 
applications from the SD card. There are a number of free, 3rd party applications that 
enable the user to explore the SD card in search of .apk files and to initiate the installation 
process which is carried out by the Package Installer (e.g., ApkInstaller and 
AppsInstaller). Unlike applications obtained from the Android Market, the installation of 
applications from unknown/unreliable sources requires a confirmation from the user that 
he/she is aware of the risks involved in installing applications from unknown sources. 
Thus, by default, the installation of applications from unknown sources is prohibited. It 
should be noted that this restriction is enforced by the Package Installer and not by the 
Package Manager. Therefore it doesn’t apply to methods that bypass the Package 
Installer and uses the Package Manager directly. 
When installing an existing application, the installation will be allowed only when the 
signatures of the existing application and the new application match. The signature-
matching safeguards against malicious applications that attempt to gain access to private 
data through substitution of the original applications. 
A major design flaw in both the Package Manager and Package Installer is that the 
user does not have the ability to only partially grant the requested permissions. If the user 
chooses to grant all permissions, only non-matching Signature (or SignatureOrSystem) 
permissions will not be granted. 
 
5.4 Web-Browser 
Web-browsing exposes Android users to common attacks such as: Cross-Site Scripting 
(XSS); URL encoding attacks; social engineering; and malicious scripts. WebKit, 
Android’s open-source Web engine, has a history of vulnerabilities. Some recent attacks 
on the Web browser include a buffer overflow in an outdated native library, and an 
explicit XSS vulnerability. Both attacks enabled the attacker to run any malicious code on 
the device with all the abilities and privileges assigned to the Web browser application. 
Since, like any Android application, the browser runs with its own POSIX user-id, an 
attack is limited to the browser, leaving other phone functions (e.g., dialing or messaging) 
unharmed. The browser is also limited by the application-level permissions it has been 
granted at installation (Internet access, ability to acquire wake locks, location-based APIs 
and network-related information retrieval). Nevertheless, in a successful attack, the 
attacker could gain information stored by the browser such as cookies, passwords, 
favorites and form-field values. Having access to all of the browser’s private data, the 
attacker could corrupt it in order to prevent correct operation in the future. 
The browser provides several security-related configurable options. These include 
remembering form data and passwords; accepting cookies; displaying security warnings; 
loading images; enabling JavaScript; blocking pop-ups; and setting (or disabling) the 
homepage. In addition, the browser prevents any downloads of files whose MIME type 
cannot be handled by the device, e.g. ZIP or RAR. However, since the MIME type is set 
by the server this filtering mechanism can be bypassed by having the server report a false 
MIME type in the HTTP response. A proof-of-concept scenario was tested on the G1 by 
downloading an actual ZIP file under the disguise of an apk. 
 
5.5 SQL Injection 
SQLite, the most common persistent storage provider on the Android platform, is used by 
the vast majority of the system and user applications. Consequently, we have reviewed 
the SQLite module as well as related code in the Android framework in order to 
understand the level of Android’s exposure to SQL injection attacks. The API of the 
Android SDK works automatically or manually with SQLite databases with respect to 
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embedding user-inputted data into queries. Manual embedding is achieved by appending 
the parameters to an SQL query string. This method is susceptible to SQL injection. An 
alternative is to automatically bind parameter values in a safe manner. It is possible to 
embed place holders in queries and separately pass on their values at execution time. The 
SQL injection issue is handled by binding the values to their respective place holders on a 
much lower level (the SQLite native library) and by embedding them not as strings but 
according to their binary values. This method renders inert any attempt to use escape 
characters in the input since they are treated like any other character. We also inspected 
the use of the SQL query and update APIs in the Android code-base (excluding 3rd party 
applications). Our finding shows that the API encourages writing clients in the non-
vulnerable approach (i.e. automatic binding) and the vast majority of the code use the 
safe API. In conclusion, the responsibility of mitigating SQL injection is left in the hands 
of the developer and only poorly written applications will be vulnerable to the attack. The 
core components in Android use the proper method of querying and are therefore safe 
from the attack. However, any additional application installed on the device regardless of 
its source must be inspected to determine its vulnerability. 
 
5.6 Connectivity and Communication 
Multiple communication transports (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, GPRS, UMTS, Cable) provide 
many options for malware to infiltrate a device. Some malware can propagate through 
more than one transport. For example, Lasco is a malware which spreads via the 
Bluetooth on Symbian devices [Emm, 2005]. In addition, it also infects all Symbian 
Installation Source (SIS)-files using social engineering. 
Bluetooth on the G1 device supports pairing (i.e. two-way authentication between 
Bluetooth devices). In order to pair, one device out of the two must be set at 
“discoverable”, which means that other devices may find out about its existence. Android 
allows itself to become discoverable, but only for a short duration of two minutes 
required for the pairing process. This significantly decreases the likelihood of being 
detected by attackers. 
The USB protocol is entirely managed by software, and is therefore similar across 
Android devices. There are two sub-protocols which are supported by Android: mass-
storage class (e.g. flash USB), and the Android Debugger Bridge (adb). The USB 
connection does not support the network, audio or other classes. By default, adb is 
disabled, and the computer regards the device as a mass-storage device, with no 
additional functions. Only the device’s SD card through USB, not its system or data 
partitions are exposed. When “USB debugging” (adb) is enabled, the device can be 
managed with the same “adb” tool which is provided in the Android SDK. This tool 
makes it possible to push and pull files to and from the device, install apk files, TCP and 
UDP redirections, etc. 
One of the Android-specific Linux kernel changes is the “Paranoid-Network”. Usually, 
on Linux systems, a user-space process can open network connections at will. On 
Android, a user-space application must receive the “INTERNET” permission in order to 
make any kind of network connection. Because the change is at the kernel level, the 
application framework does not participate in enforcing these permissions. Indeed, even 
native applications are subject to this setting. The “Paranoid Network” setting works by 
hard-coding several POSIX group IDs in the kernel. An application must be a member of 
the relevant groups before it is allowed to create sockets. 
 
 5.7 Hardware 
Hardware can be attacked as well. In the case of a cellular phone, several components are 
particularly vulnerable. Such cases are mainly relevant due to Android’s tendency to 
allow applications to access as much of the platform as possible. Flash storage (SD card, 
internal and, SIM card) can be worn out since they have finite number of erase cycles and 
Android does not rate-limit I/O or allow any total I/O quotas. Draining the battery is 
trivial (e.g., by keeping the CPU running or by holding a wake-lock) and it is not easy to 
defend against such cases. 
The T-Mobile G1 device does not provide an externally accessible JTAG connection. 
JTAG is a physical connection used for low-level debugging of digital systems and also 
for replacing operating systems. It can therefore be used to sidestep any software-only 
security mechanism. The term “jail-breaking” refers to the ability to install unofficial 
updates on a locked device. Assuming that the software forbids re-flashing and that no 
known vulnerability exists, “jail-breaking” will require physically opening the case and 
basic soldering expertise, which is more difficult than software-only jail-breaking. 
 
5.8 Software Updates 
Software update is a commonly used security mechanism which provides the ability to 
update the system with fixes to cope with lately discovered vulnerabilities. When 
connected to the Internet, the Android system can be pushed with software updates to fix 
known problems in vulnerable devices. Updates can be obtained over-the-air (OTA) after 
confirmation from the user or placed manually on the SD-card. The T-Mobile G1 device 
learns about OTA updates through periodic queries to a server over plain HTTP. During 
these requests for updates, private information (e.g., IMEI, Android ID, version number) 
is being exposed over unreliable links, and the user is left without the ability to disable it. 
The update file, signed by the provider, is verified in two stages. Firstly upon download 
(relevant only to updates obtained OTA) using public keys that come with the device and 
secondly by the recovery utility using additional public keys which are hardcoded into 
the executable. The system will not install an update which is not signed by an approved 
key. Therefore we conclude that the design of the software updating mechanism is sound, 
and assuming the implementation has no bugs, it is not possible to install an update which 
was not created by the owner of the update keys. 
So far, the Android has had more than four updates (the latest of which is the 
CupCake version) which included fixes for coping with bugs, reducing vulnerability and 
for adding additional features. All versions up to and including RC29 had code enabled 
from a debugging phase that caused every key press on the local keyboard to be sent to a 
background root shell. This root shell vulnerability was used as the first “jail-breaking” 
method of Android devices and was subsequently fixed in RC30. When gaining root 
access on the device, a jail-break is capable of preventing any future OTA updates. Later 
versions closed this bug, therefore “jail-breaking” had to be done either by using known 
local privilege escalation attacks, or by firmware downgrades. 
Firmware downgrade is a method that is used in order to gain root privileges on the 
device. If an earlier firmware version is known to be vulnerable and provides a method 
for gaining root privileges, a user/attacker will try to downgrade the firmware version to 
the vulnerable version. Android upgrade scripts employ version checks in order to 
prevent downgrades. For example, T-Mobile G1 does not allow RC29 (a vulnerable 
version) to be installed on a RC30 (or later) device. A way to sidestep this mechanism for 
the G1 was leaked in the form of a dreaimg.nbh file. Such a file represents a low level 
flashing method that only depends on the bootloader (and not on the code that does the 
normal .zip-based updates). 
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Another option for gaining root access is by using fastboot, a feature that allows the 
physical user to specify an alternative boot image. Such an image could for example an 
unofficial update that enables root access. Once it is gained, it is possible to permanently 
disable future updates. The only hindrance is that fastboot is usually disabled, as for 
example on the T-Mobile G1 and HTC Dream; however, HTC Magic has the fastboot 
“boot” option enabled. 
 
5.9 Relevance of Existing Linux Malware 
An attacker may attempt to target services, listening in on local host ports which would 
be inaccessible externally. These might include Android services such as the dbus 
(Bluetooth related Inter-Process Communications) or mountd (handling mounting file 
systems). Since some of these services run as the root user, any exploitable bug found 
related to them could allow an attacker to run his/her code along with root privileges. 
The underlying kernel code is also a source of exploitable bugs. Any kernel 
vulnerability patched in kernel versions beyond 2.6.25 (Android’s current kernel version) 
may still be applicable on Android. Kernel code security issues are likely to be more 
difficult to iron out due to the lag-time involved with issuing a large kernel patch to a 
wide user-base. This time delay may leave devices vulnerable for long periods. 
Remote exploit attacks require communication with some piece of software running 
on the device. By default, none of the native services are listening for incoming 
connections. However, the “USB debugging” service is also listening for incoming TCP 
connections which are available over the network. 
Root-kits, key-loggers and other types of malware belong to the post- exploitation 
phase and assume that there exists a connection enabling their transmission to the target 
system. They usually require root level access to the system by other means in order to 
install them. The rathole and Linux rootkit V (lrk5) root-kits, and vlogger key-logger 
were successfully compiled and activated on Android. The running root-kits on Android 
made it possible to remotely explore running processes, hide or kill specific processes, 
prevent hidden processes from being stopped, packet sniffing and provide several 
methods to communicate with the root-kit such as encrypted SSH backdoor and remote 
shell. Using the key-logger we managed to log keystrokes on the devices keyboard. 
 
5.10 Relevance of Existing Java Malware 
The Android platform does not support Java applets (due to licensing issues), or Adobe 
Flash and is therefore immune to most web-based Java exploits. However, such support 
may be added in the future and Google has already announced forthcoming support for 
Flash, potentially exposing the system to Dalvik-specific attacks over the web. 
Pure “desktop” Java malware spreads by injecting code into other class files without 
harming the valid structure of the victim class file and its verifiability. The injected code 
can cause unexpected behavior. Java malware is not very widespread and only a few 
viruses been found since the distribution of the first two: StrangeBrew and BeanHive in 
the late Nineties [Plantey, 2005]. These viruses search the user’s working directory for 
writable class files and then modify them to start execution from the viral segment. 
Java viruses are not applicable to the Android framework for two reasons. First, they 
infect class file formats and must be adjusted to support injecting malicious code into 
Android binaries .dex files. Second, in Android, applications do not have write privileges 
to any Android package (.apk) files, even to their own. Moreover, since it is not possible 
to list a folder of another application for its files, any effective search for files to infect is 
 not feasible. We modified and ran the StrangeBrew virus on a G1 phone and as we 
expected, it did not manage to access any .dex file or class file installed on the device. 
Forcing Windows OSs (XP and Vista) to automatically run a malicious Windows 
executable from a G1 device (located on the SD-card) by using an Autorun.inf file was 
tested and found not feasible. Only the icon that represents the device was changed 
according to our Autorun.inf settings. It may be possible to exploit the fact that the icon is 
being loaded by the system to trigger a buffer overflow using a malformed icon file. 
The autorun capabilities are restricted to CD-ROM drives and fixed disk drives. USB 
storage device can perform autorun if it contains an autorun.inf file and a startup 
application, and most importantly, not marked as removable media device. The SD-card 
in Android is marked as removable disk. When connecting the Android device to a PC, it 
will appear as an additional drive, but the drive will not be available until after mounting. 
After which the Windows system will not be instructed to run the autorun. 
 
6. SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF THE ANDROID FRAMEWORK 
Based on our security analysis, described in previous section, we derived the following 
conclusions [Shabtai, 2009d]. First, an Android device in its normal state is well-guarded 
since neither the core components nor the kernel can be replaced by an attacker (or by the 
legitimate owner), unless the hardware has been manipulated, which is difficult to 
perform. The only way to alter operating system components is to identify a vulnerability 
in one of the kernel modules or core libraries that will enable the virus to acquire root 
access. 
Whenever publishing a bug or vulnerability in one of the core components (such as a 
native library or kernel component), an attacker might be able to run malicious code in a 
highly privileged mode and even gain full control over the device. This threat is 
amplified due to the fact that Android’s source-code is publicly available; some system 
processes run with root privileges; and no fine-grained access control mechanism exists 
for system processes. We believe that this scenario is likely to be realized. Making the 
source code publicly available provides certain benefits, among them, many individuals 
will be able to check and verify the code. Even if the platform is never fully secure, the 
open source approach promotes steady, ongoing security improvements. As time passes, 
we expect the number of bugs to diminish and the system to become less vulnerable. 
In order to remotely attack an Android device, it will have to expose a vulnerable 
service to the Internet. This requirement reduces the likelihood of remote attack scenarios 
since by default none of the services are listening for incoming connections. The amount 
of exploitable code running on a device through local services, device drivers and kernel 
code makes host-based exploitation attempts a higher risk. Thus, we regard the device 
more vulnerable to local host-based exploitation attempts. 
The permission mechanism is not sufficiently protected and installation of an 
application that maliciously uses permissions granted by the unaware user is a scenario 
which is likely to occur. The framework also provides the adb install feature that makes it 
possible to install applications and to grant permission to an application without any user 
interaction. In addition, a user cannot approve a sub-set of requested permissions (it is 
“all-or-none”) and cannot verify that an application uses its granted permissions only for 
benign purposes. Moreover, the shared user ID mechanism allows sharing permissions 
between applications without a user’s awareness or the need for explicit approval. 
Malicious code injection via a Web browser to be possible. WebKit, Android’s open 
source web engine, has a history of vulnerabilities. Some recent attacks on the Web 
browser include a buffer overflow in an outdated native library, and an explicit XSS 
vulnerability. Both attacks resulted in the attacker being able to run any malicious code 
on the device with the abilities and privileges assigned to the web browser application. 
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Injecting malicious applications via Bluetooth is, however, not likely to occur as there 
are several protection mechanisms: (1) a device can set the Bluetooth connection as not 
discoverable; (2) if the Bluetooth connection is set as discoverable, it is only for a short 
period of two minutes; (3) the owner needs to accept the connection; and (4) the owner 
needs to manually install the file. 
Our security inspection indicated that the system is well protected against SQL 
injection attacks. However, some information is fully exposed to attackers (for example, 
all the content on the SD-card). Separation of user IDs between applications protects the 
device and other services and applications from tampering. 
Figure 2 presents the results of a qualitative risk analysis that we conducted in order 
to identify and prioritize the threats that an Android-device may be exposed to. The 
evaluation is based on assessing the impact and likelihood of various threats (listed in 
Appendix A
4
) exploiting vulnerabilities (listed in Appendix B) in Android in order to 
harm, disable or abuse the confidentiality and/or availability and/or integrity of the 
following assets of the Android framework [Dagon, 2004]: (1) Private/confidential 
content that is stored on the device (pictures, contacts, emails, documents etc.); (2) 
Applications and services (phone, messaging, emailing, Internet); (3) Resources such as 
the battery power, communication, memory and processing power (CPU); and (4) 
Hardware includes the device itself, external memory card, battery and camera. Our 
mapping of the most important threats was done into three levels of likelihood: Unlikely, 
Possible, and Likely; as well as three optional Impact values: Minor, Moderate and 
Severe. 
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Fig. 2. Qualitative risk analysis results (listed in Appendix A) 
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 Threats 17 and 18 were omitted since they are beyond the scope of this paper 
 Following the above conclusions and the risk assessment, we identified the five most 
important threat clusters which should be countered by employing proper security 
solutions/capabilities. These threat clusters were obtained by grouping similar threats 
assigned with the highest risk: 
Threat cluster-1: 
Compromising availability, confidentiality and/or integrity by maliciously using 
the permissions granted to an installed application. This attack scenario is likely 
to happen and potentially has a high impact on the device. 
Threat cluster-2: 
Compromising availability, confidentiality and/or integrity by an application 
exploiting a vulnerability in the Linux kernel or system libraries. This scenario 
was proven possible and our security analysis shows that additional vulnerabilities 
are likely to be found. Although, it has a low probability of occurring, it carries a 
potential to inflict severe damage. 
Threat cluster-3: 
Compromising availability, confidentiality and/or integrity of 
private/confidential content. Contents on the SD card are not protected by any 
access control mechanism. Additionally, wireless communication can be 
eavesdropped remotely. 
Threat cluster-4: 
Draining resources. There is neither disk storage nor memory (RAM) quota per 
application. Hogging the CPU is also possible. 
Threat cluster-5: 
Compromising of an internal/protected network. Android devices can be used to 
attack other devices, computers or networks by running network or port scanners, 
SMS/MMS/email worms and various other methods of attack. 
 
7. APPLICABLE SECURITY MECHANISMS FOR ANDROID 
Several security companies have already announced their intention of modifying their 
security solutions for Android. These solutions include various antivirus software and 
intrusion detection systems that run on the devices. As a case in point SMobile announced 
on November 2007 of their security solution for handsets based on the Android SDK
5
. 
Their solution, “Security Shield” includes antivirus, anti-spam and firewall applications. 
Savant Protection, which specializes in intrusion prevention, announced on March 2008 
that its security solution “Savant Technology” was ported to Android6. Mocana is another 
security company that ported its solution to Android, and claims to provide the following 
capabilities
7
: a secure browser, virtual private network (VPN) clients to secure data 
communications between the device and corporate network; voice, video and data 
encryption; malware and virus protection; scalable and secure firmware updating and 
secure boot capabilities; and robust certificate handling features to authenticate devices, 
network services, and individuals to each other. DroidHunter is another security 
application available for Android. We expect that other security companies, which 
already have security solutions for smart phones (such as Symantec, F-Secure, McAfee 
and CheckPoint) will also port their solutions to Android-based devices. 
In order to further harden an Android device and mitigate the identified high-risk 
threats several additional safeguards may be employed. Some of these mechanisms were 
tested and evaluated in our mobile security laboratory. In the following paragraphs we 
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 http://secure.smobilesystems.com/main/home/index.php 
6
 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2008_March_11/ai_n24384617  
7
 http://mocana.com/NanoPhone-Android.html 
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provide a description of several security mechanisms which can be adapted to harden the 
Android. These mechanisms include tools that are already ported to Android, Linux 
portable security solutions and feasible, developable solutions. The arsenal of security 
mechanisms is summarized in Table III. Each of the potential countermeasures is 
described with its strengths and weaknesses, realization approach and estimated level of 
effort required for implementation. 
When considering the applicability of a security measure, we tried to determine who 
would be implementing it and what should be the realization approach. We cluster 
Android security measures into three types in terms of their realization approach: 
 System modifications – Requires altering Android’s core source-code including the 
framework, Dalvik VM, Linux Kernel, daemons, native libraries, etc. Also, we have 
chosen to put in this category any course of action that requires modification of 
Linux kernel configuration, because of the close interaction with the rest of the 
system. The prime advantage of system modifications is the ability to add new 
functionalities to the system and change its existing behavior. The prime 
disadvantage of system modifications is that it is relatively expensive in terms of 
man power and time, requires rigorous testing and validation. 
 System add-on – Requires modifications of Android’s core configuration files (e.g., 
init.rc script); addition of applications that require Signature- or SignatureOrSystem-
level permissions; or replacement of applications in the system image. The System 
add-ons approach, provides higher privileges either through additional Android 
permissions (Signature, System) or by running as root (e.g., full file system access, 
applying firewall policy, managing memory quota, listening to keystrokes/touch 
screen). In addition system image applications cannot be uninstall; such a safeguard 
may prove crucial for some security applications. The main disadvantage of System 
add-on applications is that they consume system resources which are quite limited, 
and that they make updates harder as the application needs to be re-installed. 
 Add-on application – Can be applied by any user by simply installing an Android 
application. The add-on application is in the same status level as other applications, 
and consequently, may request the exact same permissions as any other application. 
Add-on security applications enable simple portability to any Android device and 
facilitate simplicity of maintenance. Although, most of the functionalities required 
for the security application are not available, and the limited capabilities of policy-
enforcement (e.g., quota management), as the user can remove the application. 
 
Table III. Applicable security mechanisms. 
Mechanism Description Security issue Existing tools 
Anti-malware 
Scans files, memory, SMS, MMS, 
emails, URLs, Java scripts 
Viruses, Trojans, worms, root-
kits and other malware 
SMobile, Mocana, 
DroidHunter, ClamAV 
[Shmidt, 2008] 
Realization: System add-on Effort: Low  
Pros: Well-known; extensively used in other platforms; low false positives. 
Cons: Detects only known malware; not effective at this time on mobile devices; requires 
frequent updates. 
 Mechanism Description Security issue Existing tools 
Firewall 
Can block and/or audit un-allowed 
connections from/to the device 
Services which are exposed to 
an un-trusted network; prevent 
network attacks 
SMobile, 
Netfilter/iptables 
Realization: System modification Effort: Low  
Pros: Well-known; extensively used in other platforms; highly effective. 
Cons: Will not protect against attacks on browser, email, Bluetooth, SMS/MMS. 
IDS/IPS 
Detects abnormal or known malicious 
behavior of the system, process, 
network traffic or user 
Frauds (e.g., expensive calls), 
unusual telephone activity, 
theft, malicious attacks 
Andromaly [Shabtai, 
2009a; Shabtai 
2009e], DroidHunter 
Realization: System modification, 
System add-on 
Effort: Medium  
Pros: May detect new and isolated attacks; may be adapted easily for any task. 
Cons: May consume high resources; high miss rate and false positive. 
Access Control 
Limiting access of processes and user 
to resources and/or services. 
Limitation of damage from 
malicious/exploited applications. 
SELinux [Shabtai, 
2009c]; DiffUser [Ni, 
2009] 
Realization: System modification Effort: Low  
Pros: Low resource consumption; provides effective protection for high privileged processes. 
Cons: Hard to configure; deployment of modified kernel. 
Login 
User should provide a secret to use 
the device 
Unauthorized use of the device Android screen lock 
pattern 
Realization: System modification Effort: Low  
Pros: Widely used on other platforms; known to users; effective when the device is stolen. 
Cons: Might be annoying to the user; does not protect all information; passwords/secrets may 
be broken eventually. 
Selective 
Android 
permissions 
Allowing a user to grant only a subset 
of permissions to; limiting 
permissions using predefined policy; 
relevant mainly to corporate users 
Protecting from granting un-
needed permissions that can be 
maliciously exploited 
SAINT [Ongtang, 
2009], Kirin [Enck, 
2009a] 
Realization: System modification Effort: Medium  
Pros: Effectively protecting from granting sensitive permissions to malware. 
Cons: Requires changes in design; applications may crash; only for advanced users, policy 
maintenance is costly. 
Permissions 
management 
application 
Scans Android’s applications’ 
permissions, presenting the user a 
concise summary 
Installed unwanted 
applications, Trojans 
 
Realization: Add-on application Effort: Low  
Pros: Can detect installations of unknown applications; partially overcomes the SharedUID 
issue; can be implemented by the HIDS developed in this project. 
Cons: The user is still left with the decision of what to do with the application: use it or 
uninstall. 
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Mechanism Description Security issue Existing tools 
Data 
encryption 
Encrypts private content on the device Protects sensitive information 
in case of theft or against 
malicious application 
Enabled on Android 
release 1.5 (i.e., 
Cupcake) 
Realization: System add-on Effort: Low  
Pros: Known effective algorithms; the only applicable solution for protecting sensitive data on 
the SD-card. 
Cons: Might be annoying to the user; to support encryption of SMS, emails and contacts 
requires system modification. 
Phone call 
encryption 
Providing secured connection 
(authenticated, encrypted) 
Eavesdropping, identity 
verification 
 
Realization: Add-on application Effort: Medium  
Pros: Effective against eavesdropping. 
Cons: Encrypting phone calls requires both parties to share the same application; reduce the 
quality of calls; not commonly used. 
VPN 
Connects to a remote network over 
the Internet; relevant mainly to 
corporate users 
Provides secured connection to 
networks 
PPTP, L2TP and 
IPSec-based VPN 
connections are 
enabled on Android 
release 1.6 (i,e., 
Donut) 
Realization: System add-on Effort: Low  
Pros: Effective and widely used mechanism; adopted by many companies. 
Cons: Increases network latency. 
Spam-Filter 
Blocking MMS, SMS, emails, and 
calls from unwanted origin 
Spam  
Realization: System add-on, Add-on 
application 
Effort: Low  
Pros: Known and effective technology; decreases negative user experience. 
Cons: Might consume high resources; high miss rate and false positive; requires constant 
updating of filters. 
Application 
certification 
Each application should be signed by 
a Certificate Authority (CA) 
Limiting potential damage 
caused by un-trusted 
applications 
 
Realization: System modification Effort: High  
Pros: Highly effective in providing a mechanism that evaluate the nature of an application. 
Cons: Expensive and hard to implement. 
Resource 
management 
Fairness in resource allocation (CPU 
for phone application, disk quotas, I/O 
rate limiting and quotas, network 
quotas, and traffic shaping) 
Denial of Service (DoS)  
Realization: System modification Effort: High  
Pros: Can effectively protect important applications and services. 
Cons: Hard to implement and requires modification in the framework. 
 Mechanism Description Security issue Existing tools 
Remote 
management 
Remotely configure and manage the 
device (settings, firewall policy, 
remote “bricking”, apps tracking); 
relevant mainly to corporate users 
Provide updated security, 
remote disabling (anti-theft 
protection) 
 
Realization: System modification Effort: Medium  
Pros: Can provide a centralized solution for protecting sensitive data; detecting intrusions; 
keeping up-to-date security mechanisms. 
Cons: Requires human support and high maintenance, costly. 
Context aware 
access control 
Dynamically allow and restrict access 
to resources and services based on a 
pre-defined model 
Protect confidential content 
and the integrity of services  
Locale app in the 
Market 
Realization: System modification Effort: Medium  
Pros: Can protect the user without his/her intervention. 
Cons: Hard to define/learn policies. 
Integrity 
Checking 
Verification of system and application 
state 
Offline tampering  
Realization: System modification Effort: Medium  
Pros: Can protect the user without direct intervention. 
Cons: Hard to define/learn policies. 
Automated 
Static Analysis 
and Code 
Verification 
Analysis and verification of 
applications and data flow 
Limiting potential damage 
caused by un-safe applications 
Static analysis 
[Shabtai, 2009b; 
Shmidt, 2008]; 
ScandDroid [Adam, 
2009]  
Realization: System modification Effort: Medium  
Pros: Can be highly effective in providing a mechanism that evaluate the nature of 
applications; pinpointing suspicious applications; and assisting in rapid certificaition of 
applications. 
Cons: Hard to define the indicators of malicious applications. 
 
7.1 Anti-Malware 
To identify and remove malware, anti-malware software for mobile devices examines all 
files in specified locations, email attachments, the memory, system configuration, MMS, 
Bluetooth objects and other relevant areas. It usually identifies and exterminates known 
malware based on a signature repository. 
As described earlier, several commercial solutions are available for Android which also 
provides an anti-malware component. There are also open-source antiviruses and rootkit 
detectors that can be ported to Android such as the ClamAV
8
. ClamAV is available for 
Linux-like operating systems under the terms of the GNU GPL, and the signatures are 
available free of charge. Usually running as a daemon and serving inspection requests by 
other processes, it is mostly useful as an email attachment scanner and network file 
server/proxy scanner. Porting ClamAV into Android requires the following general steps: 
compiling ClamAV to ARM with the bionic C library; writing GUI for ClamAV 
specifically to Android; integrating on demand scanning with Android’s browser and 
mail application; and finally preparing relevant signature repository. An attempt to port 
ClamAV to Android was presented by Schmidt et al. (2008). 
Anti-malware is a well-known solution and is extensively used in other platforms. 
Signature-based solutions provide low false-positives, but will only detect known 
malware and require continuous updating of the signature repository. At this time, the 
anti-malware solution does not seem to be effective for mobile devices. 
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7.2 Firewalls 
A firewall running on Android-powered devices can limit the vulnerability to remote 
network attacks by preventing Internet-based scanning and access to internal services. 
The SMobile solution that was ported to Android also claims to include a firewall tool. 
Linux 2.6 includes the iptables integral firewall which uses the NetFilter framework. 
NetFilter is a Linux kernel subsystem that provides packet filtering, rewriting and 
connection tracking capabilities that are used to implement firewalls. Capabilities of 
iptables/NetFilter and associated modules include: filtering incoming, outgoing or 
forwarded packet; matching packets by rule-matching on protocol fields (e.g., IP 
protocol, src/dest address); stateful inspection; and dropping, rejecting or accepting a 
packet with an ICMP notification. 
NetFilter is enabled on the T-Mobile G1, thus only a control application is needed. Due 
to the requirement of permissions in order to update firewalling policy, the control 
application could be implemented as a system add-on. We have developed a preliminary 
control GUI. It depends on the “su” application from common unofficial firmware. “su” 
is a program which allows running commands as “root”, and in our case is used to run the 
iptables command with the required super-user privileges. From our experiment we can 
classify the effort needed to develop such an application as low. 
While a firewall is a well known and highly effective solution that may be extensively 
used in other platforms, it will not protect against attacks via browser, SMS/MMS, email 
or Bluetooth and will not provide phone call filtering. 
In the basic firewall that we activate on Android rules are very simple and provide the 
ability to block/deny communication to specific IP address/DNS/ports. The more suitable 
firewall policy for Android would be similar to the MS Windows firewall which allows 
defining rules at the application level. In such a way we can define for each application 
who can access it and which application can send information and to where. We can 
make sure that port scanning is not preformed from the device by a malicious application, 
block access to specific websites and more. 
Firewalling at the application level on Android is not a trivial task since any application 
that is granted with INTERNET permission can open a socket at its will. Thus there is a 
need to catch an application that tries to send/receive data and apply the policy. The 
application permission mechanism is not fine-tuned enough and thus we see a firewall as 
a solution that can increase security and overcome the problems in the application 
permission mechanism. 
 
7.3 Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (IDS/IPS) 
IDS/IPS capabilities tailored for smartphones have been offered in recent years by 
leading security vendors. As a case in point, Trend Micro Mobile Security
9
 claims its 
products defend against malware and help prevent unwanted intrusions and data leakage 
through new firewall and intrusion detection technology. Norton Smartphone Security by 
Symantec provides IDS capabilities for Symbian and Windows-Mobile phone
10
. 
The Linux Intrusion Detection System (LIDS)
11 
is an enhancement for the Linux kernel 
(implemented as a kernel patch). It implements several security features such as 
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 Mandatory Access Control (MAC), a port scan detector, file protection and process 
protection (restricting even root). OSSEC HIDS is an open source intrusion detection 
system for Linux that performs log analysis, file integrity checking, root-kit detection, 
time-based alerting and active response. 
As stated earlier, most academic initiatives to enhance protection of mobile devices have 
employed host-based intrusion detection systems comprising an agent collecting various 
features from the device and then applying various machine learning algorithms to 
classify the behavior of the system as benign or malicious or to detect anomalies. 
Host-based intrusion detection/prevention systems (HIDS/HIPS) monitor devices, 
applications or the user to detect abnormal or known malicious behavior. When an 
unapproved action or abnormal behavior is performed, an action can be taken to notify or 
correct the situation. It can be used for user verification by monitoring the activity of the 
user on the device (which application is used and in what sequence, keyboard usage - 
typing rate, touch screen etc.) and by verifying that the logged-on user is the same as the 
authorized user. Anomaly-based IDS can detect unusual telephone activity, malicious 
attacks such as denial of service, and protect the information on the device in case of theft 
or loss. While it may detect new and isolated attacks, it will probably suffer from high 
rate of false positives and a certain miss ratio. 
In our Android security research we developed and evaluated the “Andromaly”, which is 
an experimental anomaly-based IDS for Android [Shabtai, 2009a; Shabtai, 2009e]. 
Andromaly employs various methods, such as anomaly detection and temporal reasoning, 
to facilitate detection of maliciously behaving applications. Based on our experimental 
implementation, we conclude that the development effort is medium and that our IDS 
requires system add-ons for basic capabilities and system modification for more 
advanced capabilities. 
As stated by Rich Cannings
12, Google’s Android Security Leader, the Android Market 
was chosen to be the place for reporting security issues by users, and users can mark 
applications as harmful, which trigger the security team to launch an investigation as in 
the case of the MemoryUp application
13
. An Intrusion Detection System such as the 
Andromaly can be used for reporting suspicious behavior of applications to the Android 
Market. 
 
7.4 Access Control 
Android incorporates several access control mechanisms. While these mechanisms are 
enforced on the application level or only on files, Linux can provide other tools that are 
directly enforced by the kernel. One framework, the Linux Security Modules (LSM) that 
allows the Linux kernel to support a variety of access control models. Zhang et al. (2007) 
introduced the trusted computing and SELinux into mobile phones. 
We tested on an Android G1 device the Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), which is 
the best-known implementation of a Linux Security Module (LSM) [Shabtai, 2009c]. 
SELinux allows restricting of any process in the system, including root-owned, and by 
that limiting access of processes and user to resources and/or services, thus limiting the 
potential damage from malicious or exploited applications. Its decisions are based on an 
access control policy, which should be deployed together with the base system. 
The main issue that SELinux seeks to solve is confinement of system processes, 
particularly those with high-privileges. Since all system processes are known a priori, the 
policy would specify exactly what legal actions each service can perform. Should a 
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 http://www.geek.com/articles/mobile/google-says-that-memoryup-has-no-malware-20090128/ 
28 
 
 
 
vulnerability be found in one of these services the SELinux confines the process and thus 
limits the attacker’s maneuverability. SELinux is regarded as a preventive measure. 
In general, all normal activities on the device should be approved by the SELinux policy, 
and any denial during normal operation should be considered as a bug. Moreover, there is 
no user interaction, and therefore no usability impact. The SELinux policy is hard to 
derive and configure while its integration of SELinux requires deployment of modified 
kernel (i.e., system modification). Our experimentation with SELinux on Android has 
shown that it consumes very few resources and incurs a very low overhead [Shabtai, 
2009c]. 
Ni et al. (2009) describe DiffUser, a framework for providing access control 
mechanism on smartphone for different users; more specifically, administrator, normal 
user and a guest user. DiffUser was implemented and evaluated on Android. Each user 
can be assigned with different rights e.g., only administrator can install/uninstall 
applications; the guest user can only use the phone application. 
 
7.5 Owner Login 
In private and public computer networks (including the Internet), authentication is 
commonly done through the use of log-on passwords. A similar mechanism can be 
developed for Android. When powering on a device, the user would be required to enter a 
secret (e.g., password, or a shape using the touchscreen) as specified during the device 
setup and known only to the user. The device can be re-locked after several wrong 
attempts or, automatically after an inactivity period. In order to use it again the owner 
will be required to re-enter the secret. An additional feature to protect sensitive data 
would be locking-up the device by means of a special SMS that the user can send in case 
the device is stolen. Biometric means for identification (i.e., fingerprint scanning or using 
a smartphone’s camera) are also beginning to emerge for mobile devices.  
Although, these secret-based solutions might be annoying to the user (the need to provide 
the secret for every use), it may not protect all information (for example, the data on the 
external SD-card will be still exposed) and passwords/secrets can be broken. At present, 
Android is provided with a simple screen lock pattern mechanism. 
 
7.6 Protecting Android Permissions 
During the installation of application on Android, the user may view a list of required 
permissions, and may decline installation based on this list. There is no way for the user 
to allow only a subset of the required permissions. In practice, the user is unlikely to deny 
installation of an application he or she wants based on such a list. We describe two 
optional mechanisms aimed at tightening access to Android Permissions. 
 
7.6.1 Selective Android Permissions 
Sometimes permissions are requested only for esoteric features by the application (e.g., a 
game may request “Internet” access for uploading high scores). Sometimes, the 
permission is requested for a valid use case, but the user does not plan to use this feature. 
For example, the ChompSMS allows sending SMS using both the mobile carrier, and via 
the Internet, but a user may wish to use only one method. 
We propose adding an advanced feature to the Package Installer enabling the user to 
decline certain requested permissions but still permit installing of the application. Such a 
change would be highly beneficial to security aware users, but would not impede 
 usability for unaware users. This solution would protect from granting unneeded 
permissions that could be maliciously used. Overall, the required effort is low, but 
requires a system modification and possible changes in the design. In addition, 
applications granted with a partial set of permissions may crash if the developer did not 
anticipate and provide a solution for such a situation (i.e., handle cases in which partial 
permissions were given). 
This solution can be enhanced to provide the option for hardening Android devices by 
limiting granted permissions using a predefined policy. The goal is to protect users from 
granting unneeded permissions that can be maliciously used. It is mainly relevant to 
corporate users. Enterprises can harden the Android devices of their employees by 
restricting certain permissions from being granted on such devices. When an application 
is about to be installed, the Package Installer would compare the requested permissions 
with the policy and would not grant permissions that are being blacklisted. The policy 
would be defined by the enterprise’s IT personnel who grant the device to the employee.  
A sophisticated policy could blacklist a combination of features, allow certain 
permissions only to selected application signers, limit resources, etc. A policy could be 
deployed as a file or be available online for reference when necessary. 
Efforts for enhancing Android security at the application level permissions are 
presented by the Kirin system [Enck, 2009a] and Secure Application INTeraction 
(SAINT) [Ongtang, 2009]. These two systems presented an installer and security 
framework that realize an overlay layer on top of Android’s standard application 
permission mechanism. This layer allows applications to exert fine-grained control over 
the assignment of permissions through explicit policies. Since implementation of such a 
mechanism requires changing the Package Manager, it is regarded as a system 
modification. 
 
7.6.2 Permission Management Application 
This solution periodically scans Android’s application permissions and files 
world_read/write_access in order to detect installations of unknown applications. This 
solution partially overcomes the shared user ID issue. The motivation for an Android 
permission scanner would be to assist the user in detecting applications with undesired 
permissions (which perhaps were accidentally granted at install time). Another aspect is 
the containment of a security hole caused by the existence of files which can be accessed 
and/or modified by all applications (global read/write permissions). In order to remedy 
such a situation, a permission scanner would present the user with permissions granted to 
each of the applications installed on the device. With the aid of such a display, odd 
permissions would pop right up. For example, a media player that has the permission to 
listen to keyboard events should catch the user’s attention. If a permission anomaly is 
detected, several courses of action are possible: simply revoking the undesired 
permissions; uninstalling the application; blocking the application from running; or 
requiring user-approval when the permission is actually used by the application, thereby 
facilitating one-shot, or one-session approval. All possible actions except the first will 
require major changes in the framework. When using the first action, the user would still 
have to decide what to do with the application: either use it or uninstall it. Such an 
application could be simply implemented with low effort as an add-on application. 
 
7.7 Data Encryption 
A mobile phone that is lost or stolen might contain important personal contact data, 
corporate e-mails, or vital and confidential company data. In order to protect sensitive 
information, stored on the device, data can be encrypted. Removable media cards that are 
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plugged into the devices can also be encrypted. The encryption is password-based and in 
order to access the device or data on the device, users authenticate with a password or 
PIN. Policy controls such as limiting the number of password retries can be implemented 
for greater security. Encryption capabilities were merged into the Cupcake update. 
 
7.8 Phone Call Encryption 
Phone call encryption could provide secured voice connection by means of authentication 
and encryption, and would effectively target eavesdropping phone conversations. Phone 
call encryption requires both parties to share the same application and it may reduce the 
quality of calls. It is mainly used for military purposes. Using the permissions provided 
by the Android application framework, this solution could be provided as an add-on 
application. 
 
7.9 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
A VPN solution is relevant mainly to corporate users and effectively provides a secured 
connection to protected/private networks over the Internet. Some VPN tools for Linux 
exist, with OpenVPN being the leading, open-source contestant. Connecting to Microsoft 
servers over Point-to-Point Transfer Protocol (PPTP) is possible using PPTP Client. VPN 
can also be deployed using OpenSSH (version 4 or later) over the SSH protocol. Linux 
also supports IPSec, which is a standard-based method for establishing secured 
connection which is also used for VPNs. PPTP, L2TP and IPSec-based VPN connections 
are enabled on Android release 1.6 (i,e., Donut update). Enabling additional Linux-based 
VPN solutions on Android involves only a low effort. The required root privileges for 
creating a virtual network adapter makes it a system add-on. 
 
7.10 Spam-Filter 
A spam filter blocks unwanted MMS, SMS, emails, and calls from an unreliable origin. 
Previous industry experience from e-mail spam indicates that there are two prominent 
methods of dealing with spam. The white/black listing approach where sources are either 
known as good (white-list) and therefore delivered, or as bad (black-list) and therefore 
blocked. A second approach is having the system filter incoming items using machine 
learning (ML) classifier filters, based on features from the transport system and/or 
content of the message. The classifiers are trained and updated over time. The ML 
approach can also use the time of day and a user profile for a more fine-grained 
classification of incoming items. In the mobile phone arena, the white and black list 
approach is more common, with Caller ID being used as the source for allowing/blocking 
a call. SMobile’s solution that was ported to Android, includes the PointGuard solution 
that can filter spam messages and calls based on updated blacklists. Kaspersky Mobile 
Anti-Virus 6.0 provides anti-spam capabilities that block telephone numbers of known 
spam sources, incorrect numbers or unwanted words or phrases that were added to a 
blacklist. It also supports a white list. Norton Smartphone Security and TrendMicro 
Mobile Security 3.0 include an SMS anti-spam protection feature that can block short 
messages (SMS and MMS) from unknown senders.  
Since a spam-filter on mobile devices might consume high resources and may suffer from 
a high miss rate and false positives, it requires continuous updating of filters.  
An anti-spam solution could be developed for the Android and employ both white/black-
listing and the ML method in order to filter spam SMS, MMS, emails or phone calls. 
 When using ML classification methods, phone calls could be ranked with the belief that 
the call is in fact a spam call allowing the phone owner decide whether he or she wishes 
to take the call or not. Since G-Mail, on which Android heavily depends, already 
provides server-side spam filtering and connection to other mail providers, an anti-spam 
solution would provide significant advantage. Since the mail application does not require 
any special permission, and there are other free e-mail clients for Android, realization 
could be a system modification. 
 
7.11 Application Certification 
An implemented solution by other mobile operating systems (i.e., Symbian), and 
advocated in the OMTP Application Security Framework [OMTP, 2008] has different 
trust levels for installed applications. An application that is installed on the mobile device 
is allowed to request different permissions (e.g., initiate an outgoing call, create a 
network data connection using HTTP/HTTPS, send SMS or MMS, determine the current 
location of the device using GPS) depending on its trust level. The trust level is assigned 
to the application according to its origin using a signature and third-party certification 
mechanisms. Whenever there is an attempt to install an application, the first step is to 
validate its certificate. If there is no certificate or the validation of the certificate has 
failed, the application is assigned the lowest trust level and can only be installed while 
requesting the basic harmless permissions. Alternatively, the installation can be always 
aborted. If the certificate is valid, the permissions requested by the installed application 
will be granted or denied based on its associated trust level. If for instance the application 
requests permission to access the Internet but its trust level does not permit it, said 
permission will not be granted and will cause a run time error if an API requiring it is 
used. 
Android uses certificates in a limited way in order to ensure package integrity and that 
two or more packages are from the same origin. Applications that define their own 
permissions may choose to grant such permissions only to packages sign by the same 
author. There is no support for root Certificate Authorities (CAs) or for certificate chains 
in Android. In order to employ the application trust mechanism, Android should be 
modified to support trust levels of applications, associating CA certificates to the trust 
level, as well as verifying certificate chains. This mechanism is highly effective in 
evaluating the nature of an application, detecting malicious applications before they are 
installed on a device and limiting any potential damage caused by untrusted applications. 
However, this solution is highly expensive in terms of implementation and maintenance. 
Although certification has been proven very effective, it is not error prone and malicious 
applications can still unintentionally be approved and signed. In addition we can assume 
that users will continue to download and install “unapproved” applications that are 
available from free Websites and prefer them over trusted applications that need to be 
paid for. Furthermore, Android is grounded in an open source approach, while the 
certification framework contradicts this approach; thus researchers should look for 
alternatives to capture application semantics without relying on manual code inspection. 
One approach which is closely related is static analysis and verification of code (see 
section 7.16). 
 
7.12 Resources Management 
There are four main resources in a computing environment such as Android: CPU, 
storage, RAM memory and I/O. Each application can request as much of each resource as 
it wants. Not all of these resources have safeguards against unfair usage. 
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CPU: Android employs Linux’s Completely Fair Scheduler (CFS) that ensures that an 
equal share of CPU is distributed among all processes. In addition, specific processes can 
be granted a larger share, but are still prevented from monopolizing the CPU. To test this 
fairness mechanism we have created a simple application that starts 100 threads that loop 
doing nothing in particular. Running this application on a G1 device resulted in the entire 
device being frozen. 
Storage: Linux supports storage quota, but Android does not enable it. This means that 
currently each application can create as large files as it wants, both on the internal flash, 
and on the SD card. The application list shows the sizes of each application, so that one is 
able to uninstall large applications, but that is not enough; files can be created outside of 
the private application folder and therefore do not counted in the application list figures. 
We suggest storage quotas in the default configuration. 
RAM: When there is not enough free memory in the system, Linux kills some process to 
free RAM. Android has added an even more aggressive lowmemorykiller for the same 
task. In practice, it has been demonstrated that this killing process can be invoked by 
visiting a malicious website, such that all applications on the system will be killed, 
including core services such as the system server. When the system server is killed, the 
device restarts. That aggressive behavior may be modified. 
I/O: Both network, and disk I/O bandwidth are limited. There are several I/O bandwidth 
controllers for Linux, but none are activated on Android. Another network example in 
this category is called “traffic shaping”, but it is also disabled in Android. 
In regard to some applications which are considered critical, such as the “phone” 
application, we suggest tuning safeguards to grant larger slices to such applications. All 
of the resources mentioned support defining larger slices for specific processes. All of the 
resource management configurations that were mentioned require system modifications. 
Due to the invasiveness of such a change, the effort involved in implementation scales 
from medium to high, depending on the exact implementation (enabling a configuration, 
or adjusting the framework to provide support for such implementation). 
 
7.13 Remote Management 
Remote management mechanisms consolidate several other security mechanisms while 
providing the ability to remotely control, configure and manage the device. This may 
include: remotely setting various parameters (e.g., Wi-Fi or Bluetooth network 
configurations); updating firewall policy; pushing security updates; updating anti-
malware and anti-spam tools; tracking the device location; uninstalling/installing 
applications; remotely bricking the device; deleting or encrypting data; providing the 
means for remote assistance when a problem is encountered; and more. This solution is 
mainly relevant to corporate users. 
Remote management of Android devices provides a centralized solution for protecting 
sensitive data in case of loss or theft, detecting intrusions and ensuring up-to-date 
security. It requires human support and high maintenance and thus is very costly. Due to 
high availability standards required by the enterprise market, the effort involved in 
implementation is medium. The required privileges for access to the relevant information, 
and effective control over the device would mandate a system modification. 
 
7.14 Context-Aware Security 
A context-aware solution can dynamically allow and restrict access to resources 
(documents, emails) and services (camera, Internet, phone, messaging) based on a 
 predefined policy and on the instantaneous context of the device. It can provide better 
protection for confidential content and to ensure the integrity of various services. 
Context-aware applications, such as the Locale application in the Android Market, are 
already available, but they require high interaction with the user in defining the rules and 
are not security oriented. The challenge inherent in these solutions is to automatically 
learn and define policies, preferably without straining the user. Its implementation effort 
can be classified as medium and would require a system modification. 
 
7.15 Integrity Checking 
Integrity checking is used to validate that the system was not tampered with. It can 
prevent information exposure in scenarios such as replacing the phone application with a 
similar application that contains a Trojan that logs phone calls or eavesdrops on them. 
The first approach for integrity checking involves monitoring changes in the file system 
in relation to a base-line state. Tripwire
14
 is an open source integrity check utility that 
typifies this approach. 
The second approach employs a hardware chip, and is geared towards ensuring system 
validity to a remote party, such as the telephony or content providers. As a case in point, 
Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA), IBM’s implementation of the Trusted 
Computing Framework for Linux, intercepts every file access/execution, and verifies its 
integrity (e.g. cryptographic hash) by employing a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 
hardware chip (which is protected against the system software) of the measured system. 
This type of integrity measurement can be implemented in Android in several ways. 
Remote attestation allows enterprises to remotely check that their employee phones were 
not tampered with. It can make subverting the phone more difficult, if secure booting is 
implemented (although this is not in the openness spirit of Android). It can allow the user 
to encrypt files that will only be available on a specific phone. 
 
7.16 Automated Static Analysis and Code Verification 
An additional possible countermeasure can be provided by applying automated code 
analysis and verification. We took that avenue by exploring the use of machine learning 
classifiers on static features extracted from Android’s application files [Shabtai, 2009b]. 
Android apk files encapsulate valuable information that can help in understanding an 
application’s behavior. This information includes requested permissions, framework 
methods called by the application, framework classes used by the application, User 
Interface widgets and more. Using our apk feature extractor, we extracted features from 
the files including: (1) apk features such as apk size, number of zip entries and number of 
files for each file type; (2) XML features such as number of xml elements, attributes, 
namespaces, distinct strings and used permissions in the Android Manifest; and (3) dex 
features such as a Boolean for each method in the framework (used or not), a Boolean for 
every type in framework (type is used or not) for example MotionEvent, execSQL() etc. 
Android uses a proprietary format for Java bytecode called dex. In order to extract 
meaningful features from dex files we reverse engineered the dex file parser, which is 
embedded in the Dalvik VM only, and developed a “dex” file parser. This parser can 
transform contents of the dex file into standard features (e.g., strings, types, classes, 
prototypes, methods, fields, annotations, static values, inheritance, modifiers, opcodes) 
and assisted in manually verifying the capabilities of the applications [Shabtai, 2009b]. 
Schmidt et al. (2008) focus on monitoring events at the kernel; that is, identifying 
critical kernel, log file, file system and network activity events, and devising efficient 
                                                          
14
 http://sourceforge.net/projects/tripwire/ 
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mechanisms to monitor them in a resource limited environment. They demonstrated their 
framework on static function call analysis and performed a statistical analysis on the 
function calls used by these applications. 
Chaudhuri (2009) presented a formal language for describing Android applications 
and data flow among application’s components. This formal language is used in [Adam, 
2009] which presented the ScanDroid. ScanDroid statically analyzes Android 
applications and data flow between applications and compares those with security 
specifications defined in the application’s manifest. This provides the ground for security 
decisions such as is the application safe and does it do what it claimed to do. ScanDroid 
provides the means for a developer to certify is application, and for the user to verify the 
proof of the certification before installation. 
Thus such an approach is closely coupled with certification and can provide an automated 
alternative as a part of the certification process, but not only. Such a method can be used 
for rapid examination of Android packages and informing Google team, via the Android 
Market of suspicious applications. 
 
8. PROPOSED MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
Referring to the aforementioned 5 threat clusters, we assessed the mitigation level and 
effort required for applying various countermeasures for each threat cluster (Table IV). 
 
Threat-1: Compromising availability and/or confidentiality and/or integrity by 
maliciously using the permissions granted to an installed application. 
 Intrusion Detection/Prevention System 
An IDS solution is well-suited for defining normal behavior of the system, 
application or the user and detecting deviations or, alternatively, detecting malicious 
behavioral patterns of malware. IDS could also serve as an effective tool in 
discovering initially unknown and isolated threats. However, since malware can 
quickly adapt and mask its behavior according to the security tools capable of 
detecting it, the effectiveness of the IDS may decrease over time. 
 Firewall 
The firewall is a solution for network-related attacks. It can prevent data leakage by 
an installed malware. However, not all attacks that abuse permissions are network-
based and therefore a firewall would be very useful against a partial set of attacks. 
 Application Certification 
Certification is an effective countermeasure against malicious applications. As each 
application would have to be thoroughly tested and reviewed prior to certification 
and permission to use any features of the device, malicious applications should be 
caught in their early phase and be unable to receive a proper certification. 
Unfortunately, nothing comes without a cost; with application certification, the costs 
incurred by the need to establish and maintain the certificate provider; modify the 
existing Android platform to support the required functionalities; and to verify each 
application is quite high. 
 Selective Android permissions 
Providing the ability to approve only a subset of permissions to an installed 
application would reduce the risk of maliciously using granted permissions. This 
solution is more suitable to advanced users, and naïve users might still install 
applications without validating the requested permissions. 
  Automated Static Analysis and Code Verification 
Providing the ability to automatically evaluate the nature of an application, its 
capabilities and the difference between what the application can do and claims to do. 
 
Threat-2: Compromising availability and/or confidentiality and/or integrity by an 
application exploiting a vulnerability in the Linux kernel or system libraries.  
 Access Control (SELinux) 
SELinux is well-suited for limiting the abilities of entities in the operating system. 
The hazardous potential of exploitable vulnerabilities could lead to a situation where 
the whole could be undermined if the attacker were able to obtain super-user 
privileges. By limiting the abilities of root processes and otherwise potentially 
vulnerable or high-priority entities, SELinux would prevent the attacker from forcing 
the system to do his/her bidding and so render the attack much less effective. 
However, since each entity requires the ability to execute certain commands for its 
normal operation, those commands must not be blocked by SELinux. In case the 
entity has been compromised, the attacker would still have the same maneuvering 
space for unleashing an attack. In other words, the attack can only be partially 
mitigated. 
 
Threat-3: Compromising availability and/or confidentiality and/or integrity of 
private/confidential content 
 Login 
The requirement of providing a secret in order to unlock certain functionalities of the 
device is a well-known and effective tool against a variety of threats, in particular the 
exposure of private content. In case the device is stolen with the lock in place, an 
attacker would not be able to access any of the private information without the 
secret. However, if the device is stolen after it is unlocked, the defense mechanism is 
rendered useless and the attacker could do whatever he/she wishes with the device. 
 Firewall 
A firewall could very well protect against leakage of information through any 
network interface. Using either stateless or stateful inspection of content on the 
communication medium, it could decide whether confidential information is being 
sent and block the communication. As the Firewall operates in the lowest levels of 
the kernel, it cannot be bypassed by malicious applications (in the absence of 
exploitable vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel or system libraries). It can also work 
hand-in-hand with an access control mechanism, such as SELinux, to provide a 
higher level of protection. Nevertheless, network interfaces are not the only path 
malware can take in order to leak private data from the device; an alternative 
approach would be3 to send the data through SMS/MMS messages. Unfortunately, 
firewall cannot block such an approach.  
 Data Encryption 
The encryption of data is an excellent means of countering exposure of private data. 
As only the owner knows the key that is able to decipher the data, the information 
would be secure in case of exposure. Even if the device was stolen and the attacker 
would have full access to all of the information, he/she would not be able to 
decypher the encryption in a reasonable time. 
 Context Aware Access Control 
A context aware access control (CAAC) mechanism could limit access to private 
data depending on the context in which the device is in, based on its location, the 
cellular network, whether it is connected to Wi-Fi and more. Such a mechanism 
could defend against a variety of information disclosure attacks depending, however, 
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on the surrounding circumstances. If the attack occurs while the device is in a 
context that allows access to the information, access will be permitted and the 
information disclosed. However, if, for example, the device is stolen and transferred 
to a foreign location, the data would be secure and inaccessible to the attacker. 
 Remote Management 
Remote management capabilities are severely limited. However, when combined 
with additional security solutions such as a firewall or context-aware security, the 
security potential increases substantially. If the device is stolen, information could be 
protected by remotely turning on a defensive mechanism. Even during the everyday 
operation of the device, if the remote manager is able to identify a worm prowling 
the cellular / wireless network, he or she could configure the firewall accordingly to 
block the worm in order to prevent any information disclosure. Nevertheless, all of 
the above depends on human intervention during the course of an attack or prior to it. 
Moreover, in order to defend against attacks at the right time, a constant means of 
monitoring the device is required. Such a requirement is likely to be costly in terms 
of device resources and demanding upon the remote manager. 
 
Threat-4: Draining resources 
 Resource Management 
The resource management security solution mitigates the threat of resource drainage 
by malicious applications. The operation of the mechanism consists of fairly 
allocating resources to applications according to their needs and taking their 
importance into account (e.g. the phone application is very important and thus should 
receive more CPU than a game). In such a case, unsupervised resource drainage is 
not possible. If disk storage quotas are maintained and disk and network I/O is rate 
limited and permitted up to a certain quota, then a denial-of-service attack can be 
fully mitigated. However due to the difficulty of implementing such a security 
solution, its applicability is rather low.  
 Intrusion Detection/Prevention System 
A host-based IDS can counter malicious drainage of battery, memory or CPU by 
detecting abnormal rate changes in resource levels. In practice, any malware aims to 
remain undetected and therefore the normal usage profile should be continuously 
maintained and validated.  
 
Threat-5: Compromising internal/protected network  
 Virtual Private Network 
A virtual private network (VPN) solution relies on mature principles such as 
message authentication codes and encryption to protect the communication. 
 Remote Management 
The enforcement of a security policy when dealing with internal/protected networks 
can be done very easily by a centralized remote management framework that is 
controlled by the network administrator. However, the effectiveness of threat 
mitigation depends on the vigilance of the administrator, i.e. a human factor, which 
is the chink in the solution’s armor. 
 Context Aware Access Control 
When dealing with protected networks, context aware access control can in fact be 
viewed as an automated version of the remote management approach. Upon the 
detection of a context involving an active connection to the protected network, the 
 CAAC mechanism can increase the active security measures on the device. Such 
measures might include connection encryption, authentication and more. 
 
Table IV. Mapping countermeasures to Android high-risk threats. 
 Solution Mitigation Level Effort 
Threat cluster-1: Maliciously using 
permissions granted to an installed 
application 
HIDS 
 
Medium 
Firewall  
 
Low 
Application certification 
 
High 
Selective Android permissions 
 
Low 
Automated Static Analysis and 
Code Verification  
Medium 
Threat cluster-2: Exploiting a vulnerability 
in the Linux kernel or system libraries 
Linux Access Control (SELinux) 
 
Low 
Threat cluster-3: Private content 
Login 
 
Low 
Firewall 
 
Low 
Data encryption 
 
Low 
Context Aware Access Control 
 
Medium 
Remote Management 
 
Medium 
Threat cluster-4: Draining resource 
Resource Management 
 
High 
HIDS 
 
Medium 
Threat cluster-6: Compromise 
internal/protected network 
VPN 
 
Low 
Remote Management 
 
Medium 
Context Aware Access Control 
 
Medium 
 
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analyzed the security issues pertaining to Google’s Android and 
performed a systematic risk analysis in order to identify security flaws that should be 
mitigated in a security solution for Android devices. We highlighted potential weak 
points in the framework such the Android’s application permission mechanism, Linux 
kernel, native libraries, Dalvik VM, connectivity media, and hardware. The risk arising 
from these vulnerabilities is amplified by the fact that as a smartphone, Android devices 
are expected to handle personal data and provide PC-compliant functionalities, thereby 
exposing the user to all the attacks that threaten users of personal computers. 
We also reviewed a collection of security-related tools/mechanisms that are inherently 
integrated in the Android framework. Our review indicates that the defensive shell 
around Android was designed with extensive care since the security mechanisms 
embedded in Android address a broad range of security threats. Google has implemented 
the Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) for preventing different applications 
from affecting each other. Setting each application as a different user prevents file access, 
signals and also distributes CPU consumption fairly with the default settings in the 
selected kernel. Additional security features are provided through the permission-granting 
mechanism that enforces restrictions on the specific operations that a particular 
application can perform. Signing applications is another significant security feature in 
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which all of the application’s files are signed along with their meta-data in the apk, 
including but not limited to the list of permissions each applications provides and 
requires. 
Despite these Android-integrated measures, we employed a methodological 
qualitative risk analysis and identified five high-risk threats that should be dealt with. The 
main security issue, we noted, is the fact Android is an open-source platform whose 
source code was published after the first Android-powered devices were released to the 
market. This increased the chance of revealing vulnerabilities in low-level components 
(such as in the Linux kernel, in system’s core libraries or the Dalvik VM). Moreover, 
several vulnerabilities were identified in the Android permission mechanism which very 
much increases the risk of malware installation. 
Next, we surveyed additional security mechanisms that can be applied on Android-
based handsets. Several of these mechanisms were tested and evaluated in our mobile 
device security laboratory. As a case in point, we ported SELinux into Android and 
activated a security policy for enhancing the protection of system processes. Moreover, a 
netfilter-based firewall was enabled that could be configured via a user-friendly, 
Android-compliant interface. We also started investigating sophisticated methods for 
locking Android-handsets and developing and evaluating an Intrusion Detection System 
based-on anomaly detection (termed Andromaly). The evaluation of the “Andromaly” 
IDS was performed using malicious Android applications that were developed in our 
laboratory especially for that purpose.  
A security suite for mobile devices or smartphones (especially open-source) such as 
the Android should include a collection of tools, optionally operating in collaboration. 
Guo et al. (2004) describe defense solution space including smartphone hardening 
approaches (OS/hardware hardening and attack surface reduction); Internet-side defense, 
telecom-side defense (i.e., abnormal call blocking rate); and coordination mechanisms 
between Internet and a telecom infrastructure (i.e., smart-phone OSs to submit SIM IDs 
to Access Point (AP) for authentication when accessing the Internet). 
Last, we propose several security mechanisms that can mitigate high-risk threats. We 
evaluated the selected countermeasures (presented in Table IV) based on the following 
three parameters in order to rank and prioritize them: (1) mitigation level; (2) the effort 
required for implementation; and (3) the number of threats that the evaluated 
countermeasure tackles. 
It is highly important to incorporate a mechanism that can prevent or contain potential 
damage deriving from an attack on the Linux kernel layer such as the SELinux access 
control mechanism. Also, better protection should be added for hardening the Android 
permission mechanism or for detecting misusage of granted permissions. Consequently 
we assign the highest priority to SELinux along with a firewall, Intrusion Detection 
System, Automated Static Analysis and Code Verification and the Context Aware Access 
Control solutions. In a lower priority we set the Data Encryption and Selective Android 
Permission mechanisms. The Remote Management, VPN and Login solutions are 
recommended to provide a competitive edge for a Telecom operator when targeting 
corporate customers. 
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 APPENDIX A – LIST OF IDENTIFIED THEATS 
1. Abuse of costly services and functions (e.g., sending SMS/MMS, making phone 
calls, or redirecting phone calls to high rate numbers) by remotely exploiting a 
vulnerability in core component that is exposed on the Internet. 
2. Malicious activity against a network or a network device (e.g. sending SPAM, 
infecting other devices, sniffing, scanning) by remotely exploiting a vulnerability in 
core component that is exposed on the Internet. 
3. Abuse of costly services and functions (e.g., sending SMS/MMS, making phone 
calls, or redirecting phone calls to high rate numbers) by an application exploiting a 
vulnerability in core component. 
4. Malicious activity against a network or a network device (e.g. sending SPAM, 
infecting other devices, sniffing, scanning) by an application exploiting a 
vulnerability in core component. 
5. Abuse of costly services and functions (e.g., sending SMS/MMS, making phone 
calls, or redirecting phone calls to high rate numbers) by maliciously using the 
permissions granted by the owner at installation. 
6. Malicious activity against a network or a network device (e.g. sending SPAM, 
infecting other devices, sniffing, scanning) by maliciously using the permissions 
granted by the owner at installation. 
7. Disabling applications or the device by remotely exploiting a vulnerability in core 
component that is exposed on the Internet. 
8. Disabling applications or the device by an application exploiting a vulnerability in 
core component. 
9. Disabling applications or the device by maliciously using the permissions granted by 
the owner at installation. 
10. Corrupting or modifying private content; or, blocking, modifying or eavesdropping 
on the device’s communication network (e.g. phone calls, Internet communication, 
emails or SMS/MMS) by remotely exploiting a vulnerability in core component that 
is exposed on the Internet 
11. Corrupting or modifying private content; or blocking, modifying or eavesdropping 
on the device’s communication network by an application exploiting a vulnerability 
in core component. 
12. Corrupting or modifying private content; or blocking, modifying or eavesdropping 
on the device’s communication network by maliciously using the permissions 
granted by the owner at installation. 
13. Obtaining, corrupting or modifying private content when browsing to a malicious 
web-site. 
14. Blocking, modifying or eavesdropping on the device’s communication network 
when connected to an unreliable network. 
15. Receiving SPAM SMS, MMS or emails. 
16. Pushing advertisements to the browser application when browsing the Internet. 
17. Loss of hardware components. 
18. Causing a malfunction in hardware components hardware components. 
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APPENDIX B – LIST OF POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES 
V1: Android source code is free and available to everyone including hackers that can 
review and detect exploitable bugs and vulnerabilities. 
V2: Android is an open-platform that provides API to most of the software and 
hardware components (SIM card, battery, memory). 
V3: Integration of native system libraries and Linux kernel modules likely to be 
susceptible to bugs and vulnerabilities such as buffer-overflows. 
V4: Android has been proven to be vulnerable to existing Linux malware (e.g. root-kits, 
key-loggers). 
V5: Core system services and drivers run by the root-user. 
V6: Unawareness of a device owner to risks of installing applications from un-trusted 
sources. 
V7: Unawareness of a device owner to the importance of permission-granting during 
application installation. 
V8: Unawareness of the device owner to the risk of connecting to un-trusted Wi-Fi 
networks and web-sites. 
V9: Unawareness of the device owner to the risks posed by improper configuration 
(e.g., Bluetooth settings, browser settings). 
V10: Unawareness of the owner to social engineering attacks. 
V11: Installing applications via the Android Debug Bridge (adb-install) bypasses user 
interaction that exists when using regular installation methods. 
V12: Impossible to grant a subset of the permissions requested by the application at 
installation time (all or nothing). 
V13: Some of the functionalities provided by the application framework are insufficiently 
protected and can be maliciously used by applications. 
V14: Short time-to-market of new applications may result in improperly tested and un-
secured applications. 
V15: Android exposes system settings that can be modified by the owner or installed 
applications. 
V16: The browser application exposes the device to Internet-based attacks. 
V17: SQLite database is commonly used in Android applications and might expose them 
to the SQL injection. 
V18: Multiple communication transports (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, GPRS, UMTS, Cable, PPP) 
provide many opportunities for malware to infiltrate a device and be activated, thus 
the device becomes harder to protect. 
V19: Wireless communication can be eavesdropped remotely without physical access to 
the device. 
V20: Content on the device or on the SD card is not encrypted. 
V21: Android is not equipped with proper attack countermeasure mechanisms (such as 
encryption of data, firewall, identification and authentication). 
V22: Android devices can be used to attack other devices, computers or networks (e.g. by 
running scanners, SMS/MMS/email worms, inject Trojans via USB cable). 
V23: There is no disk storage quota per application. 
V24: There is no memory (RAM) quota per application. 
V25: Android device, like any other mobile phone, is small in size and thus more prone 
to theft and loss. 
V26: The device is vulnerable to environmental factors such as humidity and heat. 
